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Abstract
Insurance, which hedges against the risk of a contingent loss, is an indispensable risk
management tool for both institutions and individuals. Reinsurance, namely, a form of
insurance accessible to insurers, helps limit the liability of an insurer on certain set of risks
and protect against catastrophic events, while various insurance products are available for
individuals to cover uncertain losses from almost every aspect of their daily life. This thesis
focuses on dynamically controlling the utilities of decision makers by imposing various
controls, including reinsurance for insurers, and life annuity and term life insurance for
individuals, either analytically or numerically.
Utilizing (re)insurance to attain certain objectives has long been a central focus in
the actuarial science literature. This thesis aims at making contributions in the existing
literature by applying models that are more in line with reality, both in regard to the
underlying dynamic models and control variables.
In Chapter 3, we study the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy for dynamic con-
tagion claims. Such a claim process no longer possesses the stationary and independent
increment property, and can capture contagion due to endogenous (self-exciting) and ex-
ogenous (externally-exciting) factors. Adopting the time-consistent mean-variance crite-
rion, we analytically solve for the equilibrium strategies and analyze the impact of some
contagion factors on the resulting optimal reinsurance strategies.
Chapter 4 models the basic surplus process as a spectrally negative Lévy process, and
focuses on the partial information of the unobservable stock return rate to look into the
optimal reinsurance-investment problem under the time-consistent mean-variance crite-
rion. Analytical solutions are obtained by solving an extended HJB equation, and hedging
demand due to partial information is carefully studied.
iv
Chapter 5 is devoted to the study of the optimal allocation of life annuity, term life in-
surance and consumption for an individual under a general force of mortality. In our setup,
an individual’s decision of life annuity, term life insurance and consumption are allowed
to depend on the current wealth, existing life annuity and existing term life insurance,
and realistic lump-sum purchases are considered. Assuming a CRRA preference, a penalty
method is applied to numerically solve for the optimal allocations of wealth in life annuity,
term life insurance and consumption.
To ensure that the thesis flows smoothly, Chapter 1 introduces the background literature
and main motivations of this thesis. Chapter 2 is devoted to mathematical preliminaries
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1.1 Background and Motivation
Insurance is a form of risk management, primarily used to hedge against the risk of
a contingent loss. Under an insurance contract, a person or entity (the insured) pay
certain fees, known as the premium, to the insurer in exchange for the insurer’s promise
to compensate the insured in the event of a covered loss. As a way to transfer risks,
insurance is commonly used by financial institutions and individuals to achieve certain
objectives. Typical examples include auto insurance, life insurance, casualty insurance,
liability insurance and many others . The insurer may hedge its own risk by taking out
reinsurance, whereby another insurer agrees to carry some of the risks.
The roots of reinsurance can be traced back to the 14th century when it was used
for marine and fire insurance according to the Reinsurance Association of America. Since
then, it has grown to cover every aspect of the modern insurance market. Two basic types
of reinsurance treaties are proportional reinsurance and excess-of-loss reinsurance. As the
name indicates, a proportional reinsurance treaty is one for which the reinsurer bears a
pre-determined proportion of the underlying claims, while under an excess-of-loss policy,
reinsurance kicks in only when the claim exceeds a certain limit. In addition to these two
basic forms, there exist a wide variety of reinsurance contracts in practice which are often
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tailored to the particular situation. Using reinsurance, an insurer can limit its liability on
a specific risk, protect against catastrophic events, reduce the reserve level and increase its
capacity.
Early work of optimal reinsurance goes back to Borch [17] for risk minimization and
Arrow [4] for expected utility maximization. Indeed, in a static environment, Borch [17]
demonstrated that the excess-of-loss reinsurance is the best contract if the insurer measures
risks by variance and the reinsurer prices risks by the expected value premium principle.
Arrow [4] also showed that the excess-of-loss reinsurance is an optimal one if the insurer
is an expected utility maximizer under the assumption of the expected value premium
principle. These fundamental results have been generalized in a number of interesting and
important directions. Just to name a few, for risk minimization, Cai et al. [22] extended
Borch’s result under the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional tail expectation (CTE) in
a class of increasing convex ceded loss functions, Zhuang et al. [111] and Cheung et al. [27]
investigated the optimal reinsurance to minimize distortion risk measures and coherent risk
measure, respectively. For expected utility maximization, Young [105] elaborated Arrow’s
result taking into account Wang’s premium principle, while Xu et al. [102] and Ghossoub
[49] considered rank-dependent expected utility. The problem of optimal reinsurance is also
studied in a dynamic environment. Along this strand of literature, various optimization
criteria are investigated (see Promislow and Young [88] and Schmidli [93] for minimizing the
probability of ruin, Bai and Guo [7] and Zhao et al. [109] for maximizing expected utility, Li
et al. [67] and Landriault et al. [66] for maximizing time-consistent mean-variance criterion)
over different reinsurance treaties (see e.g.,Højgaard and Taksar [58], Bai and Guo [7],
Meng et al. [78], Gu et al. [51] and Schmidli [92] for proportional reinsurance, Tapiero and
Zuckerman [99], Asmussen et al. [5], Zhao et al. [109], Liang and Young [71], Chunxiang
et al. [28] and Moore and Young [82] for excess-of-loss reinsurance, Liang and Guo [73] and
Zou and Cadenillas [112] for general reinsurance treaties).
Within most of the literature on dynamic optimal reinsurance, the basic underlying
claim process is assumed to follow the classic Cramér-Lundberg model (see e.g., Dickson
and Waters [40], Hipp and Plum [57] and Schmidli [92]), a linear Brownian motion (see
e.g., Zhang et al. [108], Bai and Guo [7], Promislow and Young [88]) or more generally
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a spectrally negative Lévy process (see Li et al. [68] and Li et al. [67]), whose intrinsic
feature is stationary and independent increments, an assumption which is often challenged
or seriously violated in a large number of insurance contexts, see Seal et al. [94] and Beard
[12]. For instance, the clustering effect due to exogenous (externally-excited) factors, such
as earthquakes, flood, and hurricanes violates the stationary increments property, and can
be more adequately captured adopting a Cox process (see Cox [29]). In insurance contexts,
many researchers, e.g., Björk and Grandell [15], Embrechts et al. [41], Schmidli [91], and
Albrecher and Asmussen [2] have suggested using a Cox process to model the claim arrival
dynamics. On the other hand, clustering due to endogenous (self-excited) factors, such
as contagious diseases and aggressive driving habits violates the independent increment
property, and can be addressed using a Hawkes process (see Hawkes [55]). For applications,
Aı̈t-Sahalia and Hurd [1] considers an infinite time investment and consumption problem
with mutually-exciting asset price dynamics for a utility maximizer. Buccioli et al. [21]
investigates the optimal portfolio selection to minimize expected shortfall when asset prices
embed self-exciting jumps. We refer interested readers to Hawkes [56] and Bacry et al. [6]
for a comprehensive survey on Hawkes processes and their applications in finance. In
the actuarial science literature, Stabile and Torrisi [97] studied the ruin problem of an
insurance risk model adopting the Hawkes process. Delong and Gerrard [39] obtains the
pre-commitment investment strategy for a mean-variance insurer with a Cox claim arrival
process. Despite the capability in modelling clustering effects, the literature on optimal
reinsurance problems with contagious claim arrivals is quite limited. The first objective
of this thesis is to contribute to this line of research by taking into account
claim arrivals with both self-exciting and externally-exciting factors.
When certain models are assumed for the underlying basic surplus process and the
financial market, insurers are assumed to know perfectly the financial market and the
claim process, including the underlying dynamics and model parameters, none of which
are directly observable in practice. Such model risk plays an important role in the decision
making process, and is mainly studied within two frameworks in the literature: ambiguity
and partial information. Ambiguity describes the situation of unknown probability. In this
framework, the decision maker has multiple prospectives and each prospective is associated
with a known probability measure. In light of ambiguity aversion and risk aversion, a
3








where X is a random payoff, Q is a set of probability measures, U is a utility function
and h(·) : Q → [0,∞] is a function that penalizes the deviation from some reference
measure P ∈ Q. Zheng et al. [110] and Gu et al. [50] study the robust investment-
reinsurance problem under (1.1.1). Zeng et al. [107] investigates the robust investment-
reinsurance problem for a mean-variance insurer, while Li et al. [67] proposes a α-maxmin
mean-variance criterion which differentiates between the level of ambiguity aversion and
ambiguity.
Another method to characterize the model risk is through partial information. At any
time point, the decision maker estimates the unobservable process and makes decisions
based on the accumulated observable information up to that time point. For example,
suppose the stock return rate process µt is the unobservable learning object, and the avail-
able observed information is the filtration FSt generated by the stock price. The investor






by which the original problem with partial information can be reduced to an equivalent
one with complete information with an additional state variable.
The role of learning the unobserved information is critical. An investor is called myopic
if he or she ignores the future learning of partial information, computes the optimal strategy
with complete information and substitutes the unobserved part with its estimator directly.
An investor is called non-myopic if he or she employs dynamic learning in the process of
searching for an optimal strategy. The difference between the non-myopic strategy and
myopic strategy is defined as the hedging demand induced by model uncertainty. Cvitanić
et al. [32] and Honda [59] showed that the hedging component induced by learning about
the stock return rate can be a substantial part of the demand, especially for long horizon
investors. Brennan [19], Rieder and Bäuerle [90] and Longo and Mainini [77] explore the
4
effect of learning for a CRRA investor, and they show that the direction of the hedging
demand depends on whether the investor is more or less risk tolerant than a logarithmic
investor.
In a Markovian setting, the dynamics of the learning process can be characterized by
the Zakai equation, which is an infinite-dimension SDE, driven by the so-called innovation
process. Pham [86] provides a survey of the methods involved in portfolio optimization
with partial information, which covers the three finite-dimension cases for modelling the
unobservable return, namely, Bayesian, linear-Gaussian and hidden finite-state Markov
chain. These three cases are extensively studied for the optimal investment problem, see
Karatzas and Zhao [64], Longo and Mainini [77] for the Bayesian case, Li et al. [69] for
the linear-Gaussian case, and Rieder and Bäuerle [90], Shen and Siu [95] Bäuerle and
Rieder [9], Jeanblanc et al. [63] and Callegaro et al. [23] for the hidden finite-state Markov
chain framework. In actuarial contexts, Meng et al. [78], Zhang et al. [108] and Liang and
Song [74] consider the partial information of stock return for the reinsurance-investment
problem on the investment part. Moreover, Liang and Bayraktar [72] studies the optimal
reinsurance-investment problem considering the partial information of the underlying claim
process. The second objective of this thesis is to study the optimal reinsurance-
investment strategy with Bayesian learning of the unobservable stock return
rate under the time-consistent mean-variance criterion.
Optimal insurance from an individual’s point of view is also of great importance in
managing an individual’s risk exposure. Directly related to an individual’s uncertain life-
time are the so-called longevity risk, namely, the risk of running out of savings and falling
into poverty before dying, and mortality risk, i.e., the risk of the loss of family income due
to the breadwinner’s premature death. In exchange for an initial lump-sum premium, a
life annuity is a financial contract between an individual and an insurer that pays out a
periodic amount for as long as the annuitant is alive, and a term life insurance provides
certain death benefit at the individual’s premature death when in effect. Therefore, life
annuities and term life insurance can be used to manage one’s longevity risk and mortality
risk.
Yaari [103] is a starting point for modern research on the demand for life insurance
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and life annuity, who introduced an optimal consumption problem for an individual with
uncertain time of death within the setup of a pure deterministic investment environment,
and showed that assuming actuarially fair annuity prices and no bequest motives, expected
utility maximizers should put all of their assets in actuarial notes, that is, they should
annuitize all of their wealth. Then in a discrete-time setup, Hakansson [52] analyzed the
problem of optimal investment, consumption and life insurance with CRRA utility, and find
conditions under which zero insurance is optimal. Fischer [45] used a similar discrete-time
model, where only two assets -a bond and an insurance asset are available, to examine the
comparative statics and dynamics of the insurance demand functions. In a continuous-time
setting, Richard [89] combined the model from Merton [79] and the insurance literature
to include consumption, investment, life insurance and annuity decisions for an investor
with a known distribution of lifetime, to maximize the expected utility from inter-temporal
consumption and bequest motive. Along the strand of literature on optimal annuitization,
Milevsky and Young [81] first incorporates life and pension annuity products into the
portfolio choice literature and focuses on the optimal annuitization strategy for a retiree
in so-called all or nothing and anything anytime annuity market, respectively. Explicit
optimal annuitization strategies for a retiree were given in Wang and Young [101] under
power utility and Liang and Young [70] under exponential utility. By incorporating a non-
tradeble labor income risk, Horneff et al. [60] and Chai et al. [25] include both working life
and retirement in their analysis. Following Richard [89], most studies about life annuity
and insurance demands simplify the decision by including an instantaneous term annuity or
insurance contract in continuous-time setting (see Pliska and Ye [87], Huang and Milevsky
[61], Bayraktar et al. [11] and references therein) or a series a renewable one-year term life
insurance in a discrete time setting (see Chen et al. [26]).
Several questions arise in regard to modelling the life annuity and term life insurance in
the existing body of literature. A single control variable, namely the premium rate, is com-
monly used to characterize both life annuity and life insurance decision( see e.g., Pliska and
Ye [87], Huang and Milevsky [61], Bayraktar et al. [11]): a positive premium rate indicates
a positive amount of life insurance while a negative one represents a life annuity whose
premium is due at death. First, this model doesn’t take existing life annuity or life insur-
ance into account as state variables, and the two decisions solely depend on an investor’s
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current wealth as a result. Second, in practice life annuities and term life insurance can
only be bought or surrendered at realistic lump-sum costs. Third, simultaneous holdings of
life annuity and term life insurance are not allowed, while in practice, a substantial number
of the families that own annuities also have life insurance policies according to Brown [20].
Fourth, the individual is commonly assumed to have a constant force of mortality when life
annuities or term life insurance are allowed with lump-sum purchase, except for Milevsky
and Young [81], where optimal life annuity without surrendering feature for an infinite time
horizon is studied. The second issue is addressed separately by Bayraktar and Young [10]
and Hambel et al. [54] for life insurance, and Milevsky and Young [81], Wang and Young
[101] and Liang and Young [70] for life annuity, but not both. The study of allocations
of life annuity, term life insurance and consumption addressing the above four
issues serves as the third objective of this thesis.
The third objective is also motivated by empirical findings widely documented in life
annuity and insurance market: (a) Annuity puzzle: Yaari [103] showed that, in a perfect
market setting, expected utility maximizers with no bequest motive should annuitize their
entire wealth, which was further confirmed by Davidoff et al. [37] under more general
assumptions. Empirical studies find, however, that only a small portion of private wealth
is used to purchase annuities. This discrepancy between theoretical findings and empirical
observations is referred to as the annuity puzzle. (b) Adverse selection in annuity market:
people with a higher level of longevity risk purchase more life annuity, see Finkelstein and
Poterba [44]. (c) Advantageous selection: those who have more insurance are lower risk,
observed in life and long-term care insurance market, see Cawley and Philipson [24] for
life insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry [43] for longterm care insurance and Cutler et al.
[31] for a comprehensive review. (d) Insufficient life insurance among the working-aged,
see Bernheim et al. [13, 14]. (e) Excessive life insurance among the elderly, see Brown [20]
and Cutler and Zeckhauser [30]. We seek to see if these empirical findings can be realized
under certain model and parameter setup.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
Motivated by all the above reasons, this thesis is a collection of three research projects
and is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is devoted to introducing the core mathemati-
cal preliminaries for the latter chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 consider optimal reinsurance-
investment problem with contagion claims and partial information of stock return rate,
respectively. Chapter 5 examines how an individual should allocate wealth in life annuity,
term life insurance and consumption. In Chapter 6, we end the thesis by providing poten-
tial directions for future work. The methodology and the main results of each problem is
demonstrated as follows.
In Chapter 3, we study the optimal reinsurance-investment problem applying a dynamic
contagion claim model introduced by Dassios and Zhao [35], which allows for self-exciting
and externally-exciting clustering effect for the claim arrivals, and includes the well-known
Cox process with shot noise intensity and the Hawkes process as special cases. For tractabil-
ity, we assume that the insurer’s risk preference is the time-consistent mean-variance cri-
terion. By utilizing an extended HJB equation approach, a closed-form expression is ob-
tained for the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy. An excess-of-loss reinsurance
type is shown to be optimal even in the presence of self-exciting and externally-exciting
contagion claims, and the strategy depends on both the claim size and claim arrivals as-
sumptions. Further, we show that the self-exciting effect is of a more dangerous nature
than the externally-exciting effect as the former requires more risk management controls
than the latter. In addition, we find that the reinsurance strategy does not always become
more conservative (i.e., transferring more risk to the reinsurer) when the claim arrivals are
contagious. Indeed, the insurer can be better off retaining more risk if the claim severity
is relatively light-tailed.
In Chapter 4, we investigate optimal reinsurance-investment problem with Bayesian
learning of the unobservable stock return rate under the time-consistent mean-variance
criterion, where the stock’s expected return is modelled as a constant random variable,
and the surplus process is modelled as a spectrally negative Lévy process. By reducing the
problem to an equivalent one with complete information, and solving an extended HJB
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equation, we obtain the explicit equilibrium investment-reinsurance strategy. Moreover,
comparison between the equilibrium strategy and its myopic counterpart is carefully in-
vestigated. We show that the optimal investment strategy with Bayesian learning acts on
both the first and second order moment of the posterior distribution of the market price
of risk, while its myopic counterpart can only act on the posterior mean.
In Chapter 5, we consider the optimal allocation of life annuity, term life insurance and
consumption for an individual with CRRA preference, who seeks to maximize the expected
utility from life time discounted consumption, bequest motive and terminal wealth upon
survival. Life annuity and term life insurance allow for surrender feature, and are mod-
elled using singular and impulse control. Under a general force of mortality, the problem
boils down to finding the solution of a variational inequality with gradient constraints. We
numerically solve for the optimal buying and surrendering boundaries respectively for life
annuities and term life insurance using penalty methods, and analyze the impact of sub-
jective force of mortality, pricing rate, wealth return rate, wealth volatility, risk preference,
safety loading factor, penalty rate factor, tax on legacy on one’s willingness to hold life
annuities and term life insurance. Discussions are provided on widely documented em-
pirical findings in regard to life annuity and life insurance along our numerical examples,
including annuity puzzle, adverse selection in life annuity markets, advantageous selection
in life insurance markets, insufficient life insurance among the working-aged, and excessive
life insurance among the elderly. These empirical findings are possible in our model under
certain parameter settings.
Note that both models and methodologies vary across these three research problems.
In Chapter 3, the underlying basic claim process has contagious features, which no longer
possesses the stationary and independent increment property, while in Chapter 4, a spec-
trally negative Lévy process is applied. In Chapters 3 and 4, the reinsurance-investment
problem is solved under the time-consistent mean-variance criteria within a deterministic
finite horizon, and the optimal strategy is of an equilibrium type, while in Chapter 5, we
work in a expected utility maximization framework with a random time horizon. In terms
of control variables, in Chapters 3 and 4, control variables are assumed to be absolutely
continuous in time with finite rate, while in Chapter 5 this restriction is removed. In re-
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gard to methodology, in Chapters 3 and 4, the goal is to solve for explicit solutions of the
extended-HJB equations, while in Chapter 5, optimal strategies are found via numerical
solutions of variational inequalities.
Finally, it is important to note that each of the Chapters 3-5 corresponds to a research
project, which was written independently of each other. Although efforts have been made
to keep the notation as consistent as possible, some inconsistencies may remain. The reader




2.1 Itô’s formula and Stochastic Differential Equa-
tions
Consider a stochastic process X = {Xt}t≥0 defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P) satisfying the usual conditions of completeness and right continuity.
Throughout the chapter, we assume the state space of X is R.
First we introduce the definition of semimartingales, which form the largest class of
processes with respect to which the Itô integral can be defined.
Definition 2.1.1 (Semimartingale). A semimartingale is a càdlàg adapted process X hav-
ing a decomposition in the form:
Xt = X0 +Mt + At,
where X0 is finite and F0-measurable, M0 = A0 = 0, M is a càdlàg local martingale, and
A is an adapted process with finite variation.
Theorem 2.1.2 (Itô’s Formula). Let X be a semimartingale and let φ be a C2(R) real
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where φ′ (φ′′ resp.) is the first (second resp.) order derivative of φ with respect to X, [X,X]cs
is the continuous part of the quadratic variation process of X and ∆Xt = Xt −Xt−.
For the remainder of this chapter, we introduce the solution of a stochastic differential
equation (SDE) and consider the formulation of some stochastic optimization problems
based on a one-dimensional diffusion process driven by a one-dimensional Brownian motion,
simply as preliminary background. More general dynamics, for instance, a general jump-
diffusion process (Chapter 3) and a spectrally negative Lévy process (Chapter 4) will be
studied in the later chapters. We refer interested readers to Øksendal and Sulem [84] for
stochastic control problems on jump-diffusion processes and Fleming and Soner [46] on
Markov processes.
Given deterministic measurable functions b(s, x), σ(s, x) : [t,+∞) × R → R, consider
the SDE valued in R: {
dXs = b(s,Xs)ds+ σ(s,Xs)dWs, s > t,
Xt = ζ.
(2.1.1)
where {Wt}t≥0 is a one-dimensional Brownian motion with respect to {Ft}t≥0 and ζ is
Ft-measurable.
Definition 2.1.3 (Strong solution of a SDE). An {Fs}s≥t-adapted continuous process X





|σ(u,Xu)|2du <∞, ∀s ≥ t,P-a.s.,
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and






σ(u,Xu)dWu, s ≥ t,P-a.s.
A sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a strong solution to the SDE
(2.1.1) is given in the following theorem (Oksendal [83] Theorem 5.2.1 on page 66).
Theorem 2.1.4. Let b, σ : [t,+∞)× R→ R be measurable functions satisfying
(1) |b(s, x)− b(s, y)|+ |σ(s, x)− σ(s, y)| ≤ K|x− y| for all x, y ∈ R, s ≥ t.
(2) |b(s, x)|+ |σ(s, x)| ≤ K(1 + |x|) for all x ∈ R, s ≥ t.
Given a Ft-measurable random variable ζ with E[|ζ|2] <∞, there exists a unique continu-
ous solution X to the SDE (2.1.1), and the solution is square integrable.
2.2 Formulation of Some Stochastic Control Problems
2.2.1 Standard Stochastic Control Problems
A diffusion process X = {Xt}t≥0 under a control α = {αt}t≥0 can be described by a
SDE valued in R:
dXs = b(s,Xs, αs)ds+ σ(s,Xs, αs)dWs. (2.2.1)
The control α = {αt}0≤t≤T is a progressively measurable process, valued in A ⊂ R. When
this controlled SDE admits a unique strong solution starting from x at s = t, we then denote
by {X t,xs , t ≤ s ≤ T} this solution with a.s. continuous paths. For a constant control a and
a function η ∈ C1,2(R+ × R), define the infinitesimal generator of the controlled diffusion
process by




where ηx ( ηxx resp.) is the first ( second resp.) order partial derivative of η with respect
to x.
We fix a finite time horizon T > 0 with 0 < T < ∞. Let f : [0, T ] × R × A → R and
g : R→ R be two measurable functions satisfying:
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(i) g is lower-bounded or
(ii) |g(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2), ∀x ∈ R for some constant C independent of x.
For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, denote byA(t, x) the set of controls α such that E
[ ∫ T
t




Definition 2.2.1 (Value function). For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R and α ∈ A(t, x), the gain
function is defined as:
J(t, x;α) = E
[ ∫ T
t





and the associated value function is
v(t, x) = sup
α∈A(t,x)
J(t, x;α). (2.2.3)
Given an initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R, we say that α̂ ∈ A(t, x) is an optimal
control if v(t, x) = J(t, x; α̂). A control process α in the form αs = a(s,X
t,x
s ) for some
measurable function a from [t, T ]×R into A, is called a Markovian control. In the sequel,
we are interested in Markovian controls.
Theorem 2.2.2 (HJB equation). Suppose functions b, σ, f and g are uniformly continu-
ous, and there exists a constant L > 0 such that for ϕ(t, x, a) = b(t, x, a), σ(t, x, a), f(t, x, a), g(x),
∀t ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ R, a ∈ A,
|ϕ(t, x, a)− ϕ(t, y, a)| ≤ L|x− y| and |ϕ(t, 0, a)| ≤ L.
If the value function v ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × R), then v is a solution of the following terminal




(t, x)−H(t, x, vx, vxx) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R,
v(T, x) = g(x), x ∈ R,
(2.2.4)
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where for (t, x, p,M) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R× R,






σ2(t, x, a)M + f(t, x, a)
]
. (2.2.5)
H is called the Hamiltonian of the associated control problem.
See Yong and Zhou [104] (Proposition 3.5 on page 182) for a formal derivation. In the
following, we briefly discuss how the solutions to the HJB equation might help us in finding
an optimal control.
Theorem 2.2.3 (Verification theorem). Let w ∈ C1,2([0, T ]× R)) be a solution to (2.2.4)
satisfying a quadratic growth condition:
|w(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. (2.2.6)














dXs = b(s,Xs, α
∗(s,Xs))ds+ σ(s,Xs, α
∗(s,Xs))dWs
admits a unique strong solution, denoted by X
∗(t,x)
s starting at Xt = x, and the process
{α∗(s,X∗(t,x)s ), t ≤ s ≤ T} ∈ A(t, x). Then
w = v on [0, T ]× R,
and α∗ is an optimal Markovian control.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we will look for explicit solutions of time-inconsistent stochastic
control problems using verification argument, in the same spirit as the one described above.
This technique requires that the HJB equation admit classical solutions, meaning that the
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solutions be smooth enough, which isn’t true in general, unfortunately. See for instance,
example 2.3 on page 163 in Yong and Zhou [104]. To find a rigorous assertion similar
in nature to Theorem 2.2.2 but without restrictive assumptions, viscosity solutions were
introduced by Crandall and Lions in the early 1980s, whose key feature is to replace the
conventional derivatives by the (set-valued) super/subdifferentials while maintaining the
uniqueness of solutions under very mild conditions, see Fleming and Soner [46] for a detailed
discussion.
For standard stochastic control problems, the displacement of the state due to control
effort is differentiable in time. However, the state may be affected drastically due to possible
“singular behaviour” of a control at a certain time point. A singular control can better
model such situations. In the following, we briefly introduce an optimization problem with
mixed type of controls: an absolutely continuous control and a singular control. A similar
formulation, but within a finite time horizon will be carried out in Chapter 5.
2.2.2 Singular Control Problems
Let κ : R → R and θ : R → R be given continuous functions. With slightly abuse of
notations, let Xt = X
α,ξ
t ∈ R be described by:
dXt = b(Xt, αt)dt+ σ(Xt, αt)dWt + κ(Xt−)dξt, X0 = x ∈ R. (2.2.8)
Here {ξt}t≥0 valued in R is an adapted càdlàg finite variation process with increasing
components and ξ(0−) = 0. Since dξt is allowed to be singular with respect to Lebesgue
measure dt, we call ξ a singular control. The process {αt}t≥0 is an adapted càdlàg process
with values in A ⊂ R, and we call αtdt the absolutely continuous control.
Definition 2.2.4 (Value function). The gain functional J(x;α, ξ) is of the form
J(x;α, ξ) = E
[ ∫ τS
0






where f : R × A → R, g : R → R and θ : R → R are given continuous functions and
τS = inf{t > 0 : Xα,ξt 6∈ S} ≤ ∞ is the time of bankruptcy, where S ⊂ R is a given solvency
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J(x;α, ξ) = J(x;α∗, ξ∗),
where A is a family of admissible controls (α, ξ) such that a unique strong solution X of
(2.2.8) exists and E
[ ∫ τS
0






Let Lα be the infinitesimal generator when we apply a constant control α ∈ A and
dξ = 0, i.e.,
Lαη = b(x, α)η′(x) + 1
2
σ2(x, α)η′′(x). (2.2.10)
Next we introduce a verification theorem for the above optimization problem (Øksendal
and Sulem [84] Theorem 8.2 on page 229).
Theorem 2.2.5 (Verification theorem).
(a) Suppose there exists a function w ∈ C2(S0) ∩ C(R) such that
(i) Law(x) + f(x, a) ≤ 0 for all constant a ∈ A and x ∈ S.








<∞ for all (α, ξ) ∈ A.
(iv) w(x) = g(x) for all x 6∈ S.
(v) {w−(Xτ )}τ≤τS is uniformly integrable for all (α, ξ) ∈ A, x ∈ S.
Then w(x) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ S.
(b) Define the non-transaction region D by
D = {x ∈ S : κ(x)w′(x) + θ(x) < 0}.
Suppose, in addition to (i)-(v) above, that for all x ∈ D̄ there exists α∗ = α∗(x) such
that
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t ∈ D̄ for all t.
(iii) (κ(Xt−)w
′(Xt−) + θ(Xt−))dξ
∗(c) = 0 for all t, where ξ
(c)
t is the continuous part of
ξt.
(iv) ∆w(Xtn) + θ(Xtn−)∆ξ
∗





)] = E[g(Xα∗,ξ∗τS )IτS<∞], where TR = min(τS, R) for R <∞.
Then w(y) = v(y) and (α∗, ξ∗) is an optimal control.
In Chapter 5, we will consider a finite-horizon problem where the decisions of life annuity
and term life insurance will be formulated using singular control and the consumption will
be modelled as an absolutely continuous control. Instead of looking for the explicit solution
with verification argument, which unlikely exists, we seek to numerically solve for the non-
transaction region based on a time-dependent variational inequality. Also note that when
the state starts from outside the non-transaction region, an impulse control will be exercised
to move instantaneously to its boundary, and we refer interested readers to Øksendal and




Strategy for a Dynamic Contagion
Claim Model
3.1 Introduction
Optimal reinsurance-investment problem is one of the core research problems in actu-
arial science. Indeed, purchasing reinsurance can protect insurers against adverse claim
experience, while investment further allows insurers to diversify their risks and enjoy a
higher rate of return on the insurance portfolio’s cash flows. Deeply entrenched in the
comprehensive body of literature on this research topic, the goal often consists in solv-
ing for the optimal reinsurance arrangement and investment decision to achieve a clearly
defined objective (e.g., minimizing ruin probability or maximizing expected utility).
In the existing literature on this topic, the underlying surplus process (before adopting
a joint reinsurance and investment strategy) is commonly assumed to follow a compound
Poisson, a linear Brownian motion, or more generally a spectrally negative Lévy process
(e.g., Schmidli [93], Liu and Yang [76], Promislow and Young [88], Bai and Guo [7], Zeng
and Li [106], and Li et al. [68]). In this Lévy framework, it is assumed that the claim arrivals
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have independent and stationary increments, an assumption which is often challenged or
seriously violated in a large number of insurance contexts (e.g., catastrophic risks); see Seal
et al. [94] and Beard [12]. More specifically, insurance claims are known to have various
degrees of contagion and such clustering feature cannot be captured by a Lévy model.
Clustering due to exogenous (externally-excited) factors, such as earthquakes, flood,
and hurricanes, might be captured using a Cox process which was introduced by Cox [29].
In insurance contexts, many researchers have suggested using a Cox process to model the
claim arrival dynamics including Björk and Grandell [15], Embrechts et al. [41], Schmidli
[91], and Albrecher and Asmussen [2]. The jump intensity of a Cox process not only
depends on time but is also allowed to be a stochastic process. On the other hand, clus-
tering due to endogenous (self-excited) factors, such as aggressive driving habits and poor
health conditions, can be characterized using a Hawkes process (see Hawkes [55]). The self-
exciting property of Hawkes processes means that the occurrence of any event increases
the likelihood of future such events. Stabile and Torrisi [97] studied the ruin problem of
an insurance risk model modelled by the Hawkes process. We also refer the readers to
Hawkes [56] and Bacry et al. [6] for a comprehensive survey on Hawkes processes and their
applications in finance. Recently, Dassios and Zhao [35] introduced a dynamic contagion
process by generalizing both the Cox process with shot noise intensity and the Hawkes pro-
cess. This process includes both self-excited and externally-excited jumps and is extremely
versatile for modelling purposes, allowing for a wide variety of features in the claim arrival
dynamics (such as the frequency, magnitude of the impact, and the decay with time) to
be captured. We refer the reader to Dassios and Zhao [35] for more on this, as well as an
analysis of a ruin problem in infinite time horizon in Dassios and Zhao [36].
Claim data generated from a Markov-modulated Poisson process can also resemble
the feature of contagion and Liang and Bayraktar [72] apply this model to study the
problem of optimal proportional reinsurance. As the state transits from one with lower
intensity to another with higher intensity, the arrival of claims can be observed to be more
exciting. However, there are no external events or dependent mechanism triggering such
phenomenon. Thus a dynamic contagion process is more appropriate to model claim arrival
with external triggering events and dependent occurrence explicitly. Models where there
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can be dependence between the claim arrival and the claim size, see e.g., Boudreault et al.
[18] and Albrecher and Teugels [3], are also of great importance and worthy to work on for
future research.
In this chapter, we propose to study the optimal reinsurance-investment problem in the
framework of the claim contagion model introduced by Dassios and Zhao [35]. To mitigate
the insurance risk, the insurer determines the optimal reinsurance arrangement. In contrast
to most of the relevant literature on this topic, we do not limit the type of reinsurance to
be of proportional or excess-of-loss form. We find later that the excess-of-loss reinsurance
treaty is indeed optimal. The insurer is also allowed to participate in a financial market
consisting of a risk-free bond with fixed risk-free rate and a risky stock whose price follows a
geometric Brownian motion. The objective is to maximize the insurer’s expected terminal
utility with the utility function chosen to be the time-consistent mean-variance criterion.
Following the seminal work by Basak and Chabakauri [8] and Björk et al. [16], this risk
preference has become very popular in recent years; we refer the reader to Li et al. [67]
and Landriault et al. [66] for a more detailed discussion of its applications in insurance
and finance. The main advantage of this time-consistent mean-variance criterion is that
the form of the corresponding value function is very simple and hence, more likely to yield
explicit solutions.
It is worth pointing out that, the literature is rather scarce on optimal reinsurance and
investment problems beyond the traditional Lévy framework. Delong and Gerrard [39] is
a notable exception for which this chapter significantly differs on the following grounds.
First, our dynamic contagion process can capture both (endogenous) self-exciting and
(exogenous) externally-exciting factors while Delong and Gerrard [39] uses the diffusion
type Cox process which only has the exogenous factor. Second, Delong and Gerrard [39]
solves for the optimal investment problem when the stock price is driven by a Lévy process,
while in our work we solve for both the investment and reinsurance problem. Third, Delong
and Gerrard [39] uses the pre-commitment mean-variance criterion, but we use the time-
consistent mean-variance criterion. As pointed out by many researchers, time consistency
is a basic requirement of rational decision making (e.g., Strotz [98]).
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The joint equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy1 is obtained in closed form by
solving the associated extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Next, we summarize
our main findings and implications:
• Unlike in the Lévy setup, the insurer’s optimal reinsurance strategy is shown to take
both the claim arrival rate and the claim size distribution into account.
• The excess-of-loss reinsurance type is shown to be optimal even in the presence of a
self-exciting and externally-exciting claim contagion effect, a finding in line with Li
et al. [68] in the standard Lévy risk model framework.
• The externally-exciting effect is shown be well hedged by adjusting only the premium
rate, while the self-exciting effect shall to be mitigated by adjusting both the premium
rate and reinsurance strategy. In other words, the self-exciting effect is of a more
dangerous nature because its control requires more risk management tools.
• The optimal reinsurance strategy does not always become more conservative (i.e.,
transferring more risk to the reinsurer) when the claim arrivals become contagious.
In fact, if the claim severity is relatively light-tailed, the insurer is shown to be better
off by retaining more risk. This is because more insurance premium can be collected
as the expected premium principle is adopted.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces our
problem including the dynamic contagion process, controlled surplus process, and the ob-
jective function. Section 3 presents the main results of this chapter. In Section 4, several
numerical studies are carried to determine the impact of the model’s parameters on the
optimal reinsurance strategy. All technical proofs can be found in Appendix.
1The optimal solution under the time-consistent mean-variance criterion is called an equilibrium solution
because time inconsistency is addressed through a non-cooperative game.
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3.2 Problem Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions
of completeness and right continuity. We consider a fixed time horizon T > 0. In what
follows, all the processes are assumed to live in this space.
3.2.1 Dynamic contagion process
For completeness, we first recall the definition of the dynamic contagion process from
Dassios and Zhao [35].
Definition 3.2.1. A dynamic contagion process {Nt}t≥0 is a point process defined as Nt =∑














• β ≥ 0 is the constant reversion level,
• λ0 > 0 is the initial value of λt,
• α > 0 is the constant rate of exponential decay,
• The externally-excited jumps {Zi}i≥1 form a sequence of iid (independent and iden-
tically distributed) nonnegative random variables whose arrival times {T (1)i }i≥1 are
those of an independent Poisson process {Mt}t≥0 with constant intensity ρ > 0,
• The self-excited jumps {Rk}k≥1 is a sequence of iid nonnegative random variables
with arrival times {Tk}k≥1.
• {Zi}i≥1, {T (1)i }i≥1 and {Rk}k≥1 are assumed to be independent of each other.
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As mentioned above, the dynamic contagion process {Nt}t≥0 is a generalization of the
Hawkes process and the Cox process with shot noise intensity. It offers a great deal of
versatility for modelling purposes as the clustering effect of claims can be captured in two
possible ways. On the one hand, it is self-exciting. An arrival in the contagion process
{Nt}t≥0 increases the jump intensity by an instantaneous amount of Rk (for the k-th
arrival of {Nt}t≥0). On the other hand, it is externally-exciting. The jump of an external
Poisson process {Mt}t≥0 increases the jump intensity of the contagion process {Nt}t≥0 by
an instantaneous amount of Zk (for the k-th arrival of {Mt}t≥0). In addition, the jump
intensity decays exponentially between two consecutive jumps, and thus the pair (Nt, λt)t≥0
is a Markov processes. Specifically, the intensity λt defined in (3.2.1) can be rewritten in
a Markovian form as
dλt = α(β − λt)dt+ ZdMt +RdNt. (3.2.2)
The objective is to study the optimal reinsurance-investment problem for this risk
process. In the following, we denote by mR = E[R], mZ = E[Z], nR = E[R2], and
nZ = E[Z2]. We use vZ(·) and vR(·) to represent the probability measure of Z and R,
respectively. Moreover, we assume that α > mR, which is the stationary condition for the
intensity process (see Dassios and Zhao [36] for more detailed discussion on this condition).
3.2.2 Controlled surplus process
Suppose that an insurer’s aggregate claim process is modelled as a compound dynamic
contagion process {Ct}t≥0 defined as
Ct =
{ ∑Nt
i=1 Yi, Nt > 0,
0, Nt = 0,
(3.2.3)
where {Yi}i≥1 is a sequence of iid nonnegative random variables representing the claim
severity with mean mY = E[Y ], second moment nY = E[Y 2], survival function SY (·), and
probability measure vY (·). The claim arrival process {Nt}t≥0, independent of {Yi}i≥1, is as









is a martingale, then for any 0 ≤ s < t, E[Ct −mY
∫ t
0









Then the insurance premium is collected using the expected value principle, and the in-
surer’s surplus process {Ut}t≥0 (without investment and reinsurance) follows
dUt = (1 + θ)E[dCt|Ft]− dCt = (1 + θ)mY λtdt− Y dNt, (3.2.4)
where θ > 0 is the insurer’s risk loading factor. As in Delong and Gerrard [39], we note
that the premium rate is proportional to the time-dependent and stochastic jump intensity
λt. We want to point out that a trusted third party can be hired to estimate and collect
the premium, provided certain model calibration techniques can be applied. Kirchner [65]
and Lim et al. [75] discuss the simulation, model calibration and estimation procedures for
multivariate Hawkes processes, which include the dynamic contagion process as a special
case.
The insurer can mitigate the insurance risk by entering into a reinsurance arrangement.
For an instantaneous loss of size y occurring at time t, the reinsurance strategy adopted by
the insurer can be represented by the retention function l(t, y) : [0, T ]× (0,+∞)→ [0, y],
and later we show that the optimal strategy would indeed be a feedback control. The
remaining part of the risk y − l(t, y) will be undertaken by a reinsurer with risk loading
factor η with η > θ. Under the reinsurance strategy {l(t, y)}t∈[0,T ],y>0, the surplus process
evolves as
dRlt = dUt + (Y − l(t, Y )) dNt − (1 + η)E [(Y − l(t, Y )) dNt|Ft]
= (1 + θ)λt
∫ +∞
0
yvY (dy)dt− l(t, Y )dNt − (1 + η)λt
∫ +∞
0




((θ − η)y + (1 + η)l(t, y)) vY (dy)dt− l(t, Y )dNt. (3.2.5)
We further assume that the insurer can invest in the financial market consisting of a
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risk-free bond with constant risk-free rate r ≥ 0 and a risky stock {St}t≥0, whose dynamic
is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt,
where µ > 0 is the stock’s return rate, σ is the stock’s volatility and {Wt}t≥0 is a standard
Brownian motion, independent of the original surplus process {Ut}t≥02. Let πt denote the
dollar amount invested in the stock at time t. Under the reinsurance-investment strategy






t − πt)dt+ dRlt
=
(
(µ− r)πt + rXut + λt
∫ +∞
0
((θ − η)y + (1 + η)l(t, y)) vY (dy)
)
dt
+σπtdWt − l(t, Y )dNt. (3.2.6)
We then denote by {(Xu,t,x,λs , λt,λs )}t≤s≤T the solution of SDEs (3.2.6) and (3.2.2) starting
from (x, λ) at time t under strategy u. A reinsurance-investment strategy u = {lt, πt}t∈[0,T ]







π2t dt < +∞ a.s.
The set of all admissible strategies is denoted by Π.
3.2.3 Objective function
The insurer’s reward function is assumed to be of the mean-variance form given by
2It is standard to incorporate dependence between {St}t≥0 and {Ut}t≥0 by adding a Brownian motion to
{Ut}t≥0 which is correlated with the one in {St}t≥0 . The only consequence is an additional hedging term in
the optimal investment strategy, while the optimal reinsurance strategy remains unchanged (e.g., Li et al.
[67] and Li et al. [68]). The interested readers may refer to Li et al. [68] to see how this interdependence
may affect the equilibrium investment strategy. We assume independence here to focus on the impact of
the claims dynamic contagion effect on the optimal reinsurance strategy .
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where γ > 0 is the insurer’s risk aversion parameter. Our objective is thus to maximize
the total reward at maturity T over the set of admissible strategies Π, i.e.,
max
u∈Π
Ju(t, x, λ). (3.2.7)
Due to the presence of the variance part, the dynamic mean-variance criterion (3.2.7)
has the well-known issue of time-inconsistency, that is, the dynamic programming principle
fails. We follow one of the main approaches to handle this problem by treating the decision-
making process as a non-cooperative game against all strategies implemented by future
players (see, e.g., Björk et al. [16] for the general theory and Landriault et al. [66] for a
particular application). The solutions of this game problem are called equilibrium strategies,
which are defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.2. Let u∗ = (l∗, π∗) ∈ Π be an admissible strategy. For any (t, x, λ) ∈
[0, T ]× R× (0,+∞), we define a perturbed strategy uε as
uε(s, y) =
{
u, s ∈ [t, t+ ε), y > 0,
(l∗(s, y), π∗s) , s ∈ [t+ ε, T ], y > 0,
where u = (l, π) ∈ [0, y]×R and ε > 0. Suppose that, for any (t, x, λ) ∈ [0, T ]×R×(0,+∞)





(t, x, λ)− Juε(t, x, λ)
ε
≥ 0.
Then u∗ is called an equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy for (3.2.7) and Ju
∗
(t, x, λ)
is the corresponding value function.
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3.3 Main Results
We denote by C1,2,1([0, T ] × R × (0,+∞)) the space of functions which are first-
order continuously differentiable in t ∈ [0, T ], second-order continuously differentiable in
x ∈ R, and first-order continuously differentiable in λ ∈ (0,+∞). For any φ(t, x, λ) ∈





rx+ (µ− r)π + λ
∫ +∞
0

























|φ(t, x−l(t, y), λ+r)|vY (dy)vR(dr) <
+∞.
Next, we provide a verification theorem for an equilibrium reinsurance-investment strat-
egy. This is a special case of Theorem 5.2 in Björk et al. [16]. A sketch of proof is provided
in Appendix 3.6.
Theorem 3.3.1. Suppose there exist functions V (t, x, λ), g(t, x, λ) ∈ C1,2,1([0, T ] × R ×
[0,+∞)) satisfying a quadratic growth condition in x and the following conditions hold:




AuV (t, x, λ)− γ
2




We denote by u∗ = (l∗, π∗) the strategy that attains the supremum in (3.3.1).
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2. For all (t, x, λ) ∈ [0, T ]× R× (0,+∞),
Au∗g(t, x, λ) = 0. (3.3.2)
3. For all (x, λ) ∈ R× [0,+∞),
V (T, x, λ) = g(T, x, λ) = x. (3.3.3)
Then u∗ = (l∗, π∗) is an equilibrium investment-reinsurance strategy for objective (3.2.7).
Moreover, V (t, x, λ) = Ju
∗
(t, x, λ) and g(t, x, λ) = E[Xu
∗,t,x,λ
T ].
In the following theorem, an equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy and the cor-
responding value function are formally stated.
Theorem 3.3.2. An equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy u∗ = (π∗, l∗) for objective
(3.2.7) is given by








e−r(T−t), and the function {k(t)}t∈[0,T ]
is the unique solution of the ordinary differential equation (ODE) k′(t) + (mR − α)k(t) + er(T−t)
(








k(T ) = 0.
(3.3.5)
Moreover, the equilibrium value function is given by
V (t, x, λ) = Ju
∗















and K(t) is the unique solution of the ODE{
K ′(t) + (mR − α)K(t) + er(T−t)(θ − η)mY +G(t)− γ2k
2(t)nR = 0,


























g(t, x, λ) = E[Xu
∗,t,x,λ







+ k(s)(αβ + ρmZ)
)
ds+k(t)λ. (3.3.8)
To investigate the impact of contagion claims, we shall compare our equilibrium reinsurance-
investment strategy (l∗, π∗) in (3.3.4) with Li et al. [68]. The setting of Li et al. [68] is the
same as the one in this chapter except for the aggregate claim process which is modelled
by a Lévy process which has no self-exciting or externally-exciting effect. We find that
the equilibrium investment strategy π∗ is identical to the one in Li et al. [68], a conclusion
which can be explained by the independence between the aggregate claim process and the
stock price dynamic. The equilibrium reinsurance strategy in Li et al. [68] is given by






First of all, we see from (3.3.4) and (3.3.9) that both equilibrium reinsurance strategies
are of excess-of-loss form under the time-consistent mean-variance criterion.
Second, for the equilibrium reinsurance strategy l̃ in Li et al. [68], the retention limit
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R̃L(t) is independent of the claim severity Y (which may be viewed as a possible short-
coming in actuarial practice). Our results show that, in the presence of claim contagion,
the equilibrium reinsurance strategy l∗ does rely on the distribution of the claim severity
Y (through the function k(t)).
Third, when mR = 0 (i.e., there is no self-exciting effect as R = 0), we have l
∗ =
l̃. Further, the equilibrium reinsurance strategy l∗ does not depend on the externally-
exciting jumps (e.g., the distribution of Z and the Poisson intensity ρ). Note that both
the insurer and reinsurer charge premium according to the expected value principle and
as such, a change in the claim arrival intensity λt is offset by the corresponding change in
insurance/reinsurance premium. Hence, one concludes from the form of l∗ that externally-
exciting effect can be perfectly hedged by adjusting the premium rate while the self-exciting
effect needs to be mitigated by adjusting both the premium rate and the reinsurance
strategy. In other words, the self-exciting effect is of a more dangerous nature than the
externally-exciting effect, as the former requires more risk management tools.
The sign of k(t) plays an important role in the reinsurance strategy l∗. If k(t) ≥ (≤)0,
the retention limits are such that RL∗(t) ≥ (≤)R̃L(t), which implies that the insurer retains
more (less) risk when the claims are contagious. The following proposition provides the
sufficient and necessary condition to determine the sign of k(t) when r = 0.








, we have k(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Further, k(t) and RL∗(t) are








, we have k(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Further, k(t) and RL∗(t) are
increasing in α and decreasing in mR.
Commonly used measures to indicate a heavily-tailed distribution include nonexistence




E[Y ] ∈ [0, 1] can also be viewed as a measure of tail risk of Y . Larger values of this
ratio indicate a heavier tail for Y . Part (1) of Proposition 3.3.3 implies that, if the claim
size Y is light-tail, the insurer will retain more risk due to the contagion effect. This is the
case as the insurer collects more premium income to undertake this relatively low risk. The
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latter part very much agrees with intuition that the insurer retains more risk if the claim
arrival intensity decays slower (α is smaller) or the self-exciting effect is more significant
(mR is larger). The converse implication is true for part (2).
In summary, Proposition 3.3.3 shows that for r = 0 the insurer’s reinsurance strategy
becomes more sophisticated when the claims contagion effect is considered. More precisely,
the insurer’s preference is strongly dependent on the tail heaviness of the generic claim size
Y . We expect the implications to hold for sufficiently small r (the formal proof goes
beyond the scope of this chapter). Nonetheless, we refer the reader to Section 4.1 for some
numerical examples supporting this claim.
In the next proposition, we further analyze the behaviour of the optimal retention limit
in terms of some other model parameters.
Proposition 3.3.4. (1) The optimal reinsurance strategy RL∗(t) and k(t) are decreasing
in γ.
(2) The optimal reinsurance strategy RL∗(t) and k(t) are increasing in θ.





E[Y ] ≤ (≥)
θ
η
and r = 0, then k(t) ↓ (↑)0 and RL∗(t) ↓ (↑)R̃L(·) as t→ T .
Part (1) of Proposition 3.3.4 implies that all else being equal, a more risk-averse insurer
retains less risk than its less risk-averse counterpart. This is consistent with the strategy
l̃(t, y) in (3.3.9). For part (2), we observe that a larger insurer’s loading factor θ leads
the insurer to take on more risk, while for l̃(t, y) no such incentives exist. Part (3) of
Proposition 3.3.4 implies such adjustment will diminish as time approaches to maturity
because the impact of claims contagion reduces over time.
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3.4 Numerical examples
Throughout this section, we assume that the generic claim size Y follows a gamma







where a is the so-called shape parameter and b is the scale parameter. Also throughout, we
make use of the well-known finite difference method to evaluate the function k satisfying
the ODE (3.5) in the retention limit RL∗.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume the following default values of model parameters:
a = 10, b = 3, α = 3, mR = 1, nR = 2, mZ = 1, nZ = 2, θ = 0.3, η = 0.4, γ = 0.05, ρ = 2,
σ = 0.3, µ = 0.05, r = 0.01 and T = 5.
3.4.1 Proposition 3.3.3 for small r
First, we show via numerical examples that the conclusions of Proposition 3.3.3 for
r = 0 also holds for small risk-free rates r > 0. Figure 3.1 depicts the function k(t)







. In Figure 3.2, we redo the same exercise under the same parameter setting







. As we can see, the results are consistent with
those in Proposition 3.3.3.
3.4.2 Impact of model parameters on RL∗(t)
The impact of most model parameters were analytically studied in Propositions 3.3.3
and 3.3.4. In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium retention
limit RL∗(t) in terms of the risk-free rate r and the reinsurer’s premium rate η.
Figure 3.3 depicts the retention limit RL∗(t) as a function of the risk-free rate r. As
expected, we observe that the insurer is incentivized to take on less risk as r increases.
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(a) Impact of α (b) Impact of mR








(a) Impact of α (b) Impact of mR








Note that this relation was also shown to hold in the Lévy framework (see Li et al. [68]).
It can be rationalized as follows: the increased return from the risk-free bond allows the
insurer to increase the reinsurance coverage by lowering the retention limit. As expected,
the sensitivity of the retention limit RL∗(t) with respect to the risk-free rate r is more
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Figure 3.3: Effect of risk-free rate r on retention limit RL∗(t)
pronounced for smaller t.
(a) RL∗(0), T = 5 (b) RL∗(t), γ = 0.08, T = 5 (c) RL∗(0), T = 1
Figure 3.4: Impact of η on the retention limit RL∗
Figure 3.4a depicts the retention limit RL∗(0) as a function of the reinsurer’s risk
loading factor η. As expected, we note that RL∗(t) −→ +∞ as η → +∞ which means
that the insurer retains the entire risk if reinsurance is extremely expensive. Moreover, it
is very interesting to see from Figure 3.4a (for the cases γ = 0.08 and γ = 0.1) that the
retention limit RL∗(0) is not necessarily monotonically increasing in η. In other words,
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the insurer may buy more reinsurance at time 0 when the reinsurer’s loading factor is
higher. To shed more light into this phenomenon, we display in Figure 3.4b the equilibrium
retention limit RL∗(t) as a function of t for two reinsurer’s loading factors, namely η = 0.35
and η = 1.5. We observe that when the cost of reinsurance increases from η = 0.35 to
η = 1.5, the insurer first purchases more reinsurance but beyond a certain time point, the
optimal strategy dictates that less reinsurance should be purchased. By the nature of the
equilibrium strategies, one shall compare the strategy trajectories as a whole rather than
performing a point-wise comparison of them. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium
strategies are dynamic. If we venture into the comparison of the two equilibrium strategies
displayed in Figure 3.4b, the behaviour observed in the time-0 reinsurance strategy can
be largely explained by the presence of self-exciting claims. Indeed, with no self-exciting
effect, we know from Theorem 3.3.2 that the equilibrium retention limit increases in η for
all t. As alluded above, when the self-exciting contagion risk is included, the equilibrium
retention limit is not necessarily increasing in η at each time point. The aforementioned
time-0 phenomenon is also related to the length of time horizon T , that is, it is more
likely to occur with longer time horizon because the impact of self-exciting claims is more
significant. Indeed, in Figure 3.4c, we observe that for the shorter time horizon T = 1, the
monotonicity of the retention limit with respect to η is observed.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, an optimal reinsurance-investment problem for a dynamic contagion
process is considered. The claim arrival process is versatile, allowing for self-exciting
and externally-exciting clustering behaviour in the process claim arrivals. Under the
time-consistent mean-variance criterion, we obtain the explicit equilibrium reinsurance-
investment strategy. Our main conclusion is that unlike the result in the Lévy framework,
the insurer should take both the claim size distribution and the claim arrival rate into
consideration.
Most notably, we find that an excess-of-loss type of reinsurance is optimal even in the
presence of self-exciting and externally-exciting effect of claim contagion. Second, the self-
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exciting contagion risk is more dangerous in nature than the externally-exciting risk, since
more advanced risk hedging tools are necessary. Third, the insurer’s attitude towards claim
risk depends on the tail heaviness of the claim size distribution. When the claim size is
light tail distributed, the insurer can be better off retaining more risk.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
We start by showing that for a function f(t, x, λ) ∈ C1,2,1
(
[0, T ]×R× [0,∞)
)
satisfying
a quadratic growth condition in x, i.e., there exists a constant C > 0 such that
|f(t, x, λ)| ≤ C(1+|x|2),







= f(t, x, λ) + E
[ ∫ T
t
Auf(s,Xu,t,x,λs , λt,λs )ds
]
.
To see this, for any stopping time τ valued in [t,∞), by Itô’s formula,
f(T ∧ τ,Xu,t,x,λT∧τ , λ
t,λ
T∧τ )
= f(t, x, λ) +
∫ T∧τ
t



























f(s,Xu,t,x,λs − l(s, y), λt,λs + r)− f(t, x, λ)
)
vY (dy)vR(dr)dÑs,
where M̃s = Mt − ρt and Ñt = Nt −
∫ t
0
λsds are the compensated process of M and







s )ds > n}, then







s )dWs}t≤w≤T is a mar-
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tingale. By taking expectation, we get
E
[




= f(t, x, λ) + E
[ ∫ T∧τn
t
Auf(s,Xu,t,x,λs , λt,λs )ds
]
.
Since f satisfies the quadratic growth condition, we have
|f(T ∧ τn, Xu,t,x,λT∧τn , λ
t,λ
T∧τn)| ≤ C(1 + sup
w∈[t,T ]
|Xu,t,x,λw |2),
and the righthand side is integrable, see Pham [85] (Theorem 1.3.15 on page 23) for in-








= f(t, x, λ) + E
[ ∫ T
t
Auf(s,Xu,t,x,λs , λt,λs )ds
]
.









= V (t, x, λ) + E
[ ∫ T
t











= g(t, x, λ) + E
[ ∫ T
t











= g2(t, x, λ) + E
[ ∫ T
t
Au∗g2(s,Xu∗,t,x,λs , λt,λs )ds
]
. (3.6.3)








From (3.3.2), (3.3.3) and (3.6.2), we can see that





































From (3.3.1) and (3.3.2), we have
Au∗V (t, x, λ)− γ
2
Au∗g2(t, x, λ) = 0. (3.6.5)
Now by (3.6.1) and the terminal condition (3.3.3),










































where the second equality is due to (3.6.5) and the third equality is due to (3.6.4).
We now go on to show that u∗ is indeed an equilibrium strategy. For any u = (l, π) ∈
[0, y]× R, ε > 0 we define a strategy uε as follows:
uε(s, y) =
{
u, s ∈ [t, t+ ε), y > 0,
(l∗(s, y), π∗s) , s ∈ [t+ ε, T ], y > 0.





















































































































































From (3.3.1), for the given u, we have
AuV (t, x, λ)− γ
2
Aug2(t, x, λ) + γg(t, x, λ)Aug(t, x, λ) ≤ 0,





















− g2(t, x, λ)
)































Compare (3.6.7) and (3.6.8), and notice that V (t, x, λ) = Ju
∗
(t, x, λ), we obtain,
Ju
∗
(t, x, λ)− Juε(t, x, λ) ≥ o(ε).
The proof is now complete.
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3.6.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
We first derive the equilibrium strategy u∗ = (l∗, π∗). With some calculations, the




AuV (t, x, λ)− γ
2
Aug2(t, x, λ) + γg(t, x, λ)Aug(t, x, λ)
}








V (t, x, λ+ z)− V (t, x, λ) + γg(t, x, λ)g(t, x, λ+ z)− γ
2
































γg(t, x, λ)g(t, x− l(t, y), λ+ u)− γ
2





We then consider the following ansatzes
V (t, x, λ) = er(T−t)x+ A(t) +K(t)λ and g(t, x, λ) = er(T−t)x+ a(t) + k(t)λ,
where the functions A(t), K(t), a(t), k(t) are to be determined. From equation (3.3.3), we
know that
V (T, x, λ) = x+ A(T ) +K(T )λ = x and g(T, x, λ) = x+ a(T ) + k(T )λ = x
for all (x, λ) ∈ R× (0,+∞). We deduce that A(T ) = K(T ) = a(T ) = k(T ) = 0. Using the
above forms of V (t, x, λ) and g(t, x, λ), the above two maximization problems with respect
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γg(t, x, λ)g(t, x− l(t, y), λ+ u)− γ
2




























For the problem (3.6.10), note that the quadratic function
f(l) = −γ
2
e2r(T−t)l2 + (η + γmRk(t))e
r(T−t)l
attains the maximum in the region l ∈ [0, y] at




Using the same ansatz g(t, x, λ) = er(T−t)x+ a(t) + k(t)λ and the form of u∗ = (l∗, π∗),
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equation (3.3.2) becomes
0 = Au∗g(t, x, λ)
= λ
k′(t) + (mR − α)k(t) + er(T−t)












+ k(t)(αβ + ρmZ),
which holds for all (t, x, λ) ∈ [0, T ]× R× (0,+∞). It implies that
k′(t) + (mR − α)k(t) + er(T−t)










+ k(t)(αβ + ρmZ) = 0.







+ k(s)(αβ + ρmZ)
)
ds,
and k(t) satisfies the ODE
k′(t) + (mR − α)k(t) + er(T−t)







k(T ) = 0.
Note that the above ODE satisfies the uniform Lipschitz condition in the sense that its
generator
f(t, x) = (α−mR)x− er(T−t)





















≤ (α−mR) |x− z|+
η
γ
∣∣[η + γmRx]+ − [η + γmRz]+∣∣




= (α−mR + ηmR)|x− z|.
Therefore, ODE (3.3.5) has a unique solution.
It remains to derive the form of the value function V (t, x, λ). From the form of the
equilibrium strategy u∗ = (l∗, π∗), the extended HJB equation (3.3.1) becomes
0 = Au∗V (t, x, λ)− γ
2
Au∗g2(t, x, λ) + γg(t, x, λ)Au∗g(t, x, λ)
= λ
(



























































and K(t) is the unique solution of the following ODE{




K(T ) = 0.
The uniqueness is due to the uniform Lipschitz condition of its generator. This ends the
proof.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
We only prove part (1) as the other part is completely symmetric to it. We first























0 SY (y)dy = (1 −
θ
η
)mY , k̃(t) ≡ 0 is the



















SY (y)dy ≥ 0.
By the comparison principle (e.g., Terrell [100, lemma E.4]), we deduce that k̃(t) ≥ 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. Equivalently, we have k(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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Next we show the monotonicity of k(t) with respect to α and mR. The monotonicity of
RL∗(t) follows immediately. Let p(t) = ∂k(t)
∂α
and q(t) = ∂k(t)
∂mR
for t ∈ [0, T ]. Differentiating




















































Since k(t) is nonnegative for all t ∈ [0, T ], we deduce that p(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus,
































which implies that k(t) is increasing in mR.
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3.4
(1) We denote m(t) := ∂k(t)
∂γ
. Differentiating equation (3.3.5) with respect to γ yields
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We then deduce that both k(t) and RL∗(t) are decreasing in γ.
(2) By the same argument as in part (1), by letting n(t) := ∂k(t)
∂θ

























Therefore, it is immediate that both k(t) and RL∗(t) are increasing in θ.
(3) Note that equation (3.3.5) is an autonomous ordinary differential equation, and
hence the function k(t) is monotone in t (see, e.g., Lemma 1.7 in Hale and Koçak [53]).




Strategy with Bayesian Learning
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy with Bayesian learn-
ing for a mean-variance insurer. The stock return rate µ is modelled as an unobservable
constant random variable (not time-dependent). The insurer utilizes observed stock prices
to learn about µ, and then uses the learning results and reinsurance to maximize the
mean-variance objective function. As new stock prices are observed, learning results and
investment strategies will be updated accordingly. The main contribution of this work is
as follows:
First, an explicit form of optimal reinsurance-investment strategy up to a solution of
a linear parabolic PDE is obtained. Zhang et al. [108] considers the optimal investment
and proportional reinsurance problem for an exponential utility maximizer. Liang and
Song [74] studies the same mean-variance problem, where reinsurance is constrained to be
a proportional one and the stock return rate is modelled as a finite-state hidden Markov
chain. Optimal strategies with Bayesian learning of the stock return rate for a mean-
variance insurer is not yet studied to the best of our knowledge.
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Second, the hedging demand due to the uncertainty of the stock return rate is analyzed
qualitatively. An investor is called myopic if he or she refrains from future learning of partial
information, and acts as if the learning result is certain going forward. The difference
between the optimal strategy and its myopic counterpart is called hedging demand, a term
introduced by Merton et al. [80], representing the demand the insurer needs to protect
himself against unfavourable shifts in the stock return.
Our work shows that: (1) The optimal investment strategy degenerates to the myopic
one when the stock return rate is a deterministic constant. (2) The hedging demand
diminishes at the end of the time horizon. (3) If the learning result of the market price
of risk always lies outside of a deterministic band and the optimal investment strategy
and its myopic counterpart are of the same sign, then the optimal investment strategy is
always more conservative. (4) Whether the two strategies are of the same sign depends on
the magnitude of the posterior variance of the market price of risk. From our numerical
analysis, when the posterior variance of the market price of risk is relatively large, the
optimal investment strategy will take a short position even when the market price of risk
is positive. This makes economic sense, since when the posterior mean of the market price
of risk is positive, close to 0 and with a large posterior variance, there is a high probability
that it will go below zero. The optimal investment strategy can capture this effect and
take a short position accordingly, while the myopic one will take a long position as long as
the posterior mean of market price of risk is positive. Therefore, our optimal investment
strategy is better in the sense that it can act on both the first and second moments of the
posterior distribution. (5) From our numerical analysis, when the distribution of market
price of risk is not too scattered, the longer the time horizon, the more conservative our
optimal investment strategy would be.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 the mathemat-
ical model of reinsurance-investment problem is formulated, and the objective function
is presented. In section 4.3 we reduce the partially observable problem to an equivalent
one with complete observation. In section 4.4, the main results for the explicit optimal
reinsurance-investment strategy and the value function are given, and the hedging demand
is analyzed qualitatively. In section 4.5, some numerical examples are provided. All proofs
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are postponed to Appendix 4.6.
4.2 Problem formulation
In this section we introduce our models for the insurance risk, the financial market and
the objective function. Consider a fixed time horizon T > 0, and a complete probability
space (Ω,F ,P). In what follows, we use E to denote the expectation with respect to P.
Suppose the probability space is large enough to accommodate two uncertainties from the
insurance risk and the financial market.
4.2.1 Surplus process for the insurance company
Consider an insurer’s basic surplus process characterized by a spectrally negative Lévy
process defined on (Ω,F ,P) with dynamics
dUt = cdt+ σ1dBt −
∫ ∞
0
zN(dz, dt), U0 > 0, (4.2.1)
where c > 0 is the insurance premium rate, B = {Bt}0≤t≤T is a standard Brownian motion
on (Ω,F ,P) which represents a perturbation of insurance surplus with a volatility σ1 > 0,
and N(dz, dt) is a Poisson random measure, independent of B, representing the number
of insurance claims of size(z, z + dz) within the time period (t, t + dt). We denote the
compensated measure of N(dz, dt) by Ñ(dz, dt) = N(dz, dt) − v(dz)dt, in which v is a
Lévy measure such that
∫∞
0
z2v(dz) < ∞, and v(dz) represents the expected number of
insurance claims of size (z, z + dz) within a unit time interval.
The insurance premium rate is computed under the expected value principle, that is,
c = (1 + θ)
∫∞
0
zv(dz), in which θ > 0 is the so-called safety loading of the insurer. At any
time t ∈ [0, T ], the insurer facing a claim size z can manage the claim risk by purchasing a
reinsurance policy with retention level l(t, z), that is, l(t, z) will be covered by the insurer
and the remaining part z−l(t, z) will be paid by the reinsurer. Certain reinsurance premium
needs to be paid to transfer the risk, and we assume such reinsurance premium is also
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collected via expected value principal with the safety loading factor η. More specifically,







Then the controlled surplus process under the reinsurance strategy l follows the dynamic:
dRlt = dUt − (1 + η)
∫ ∞
0
[z − l(t, z)]v(dz)dt+
∫ ∞
0
















We assume that the reinsurance is more expensive than the insurance, i.e., η > θ to exclude
trivial results, and the retention level is nonnegative and no larger than the total claim
size, i.e., 0 ≤ l(t, z) ≤ z, for any t ∈ [0, T ], z ≥ 0.
4.2.2 The financial market
Now assume that the insurer can further invest the collected premium in a financial
market consisting of a risk-free bond with a constant interest rate r > 0 and a risky stock,
whose price {St}t≥0 is governed by
dSt = St(µdt+ σ2dWt), S0 > 0, (4.2.3)
where {Wt}0≥0 is a standard Brownian motion on (Ω,F ,P) with respect to its natural
filtration FW := {FWt }t≥0, σ2 > 0 (a known constant) is the volatility of the stock, and
µ is a random variable, which we use to characterize the uncertainty of the stock’s return
rate. We further assume that B,N(·, ·) and µ are mutually independent. Moreover, B and





the Bayesian framework, we denote the prior distribution of µ under P as follows:
χ(A) = P[µ ∈ A], A ∈ B(R)
and assume that E[µ] <∞. B(R) denotes the Borel σ-algebra of R.
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A reinsurance-investment strategy is described by a pair process u = {(πt, lt)}t∈[0,T ],
where πt represents the amount of money invested in stock at time t. Corresponding to a




+ r[Xut − πt]dt+ dRlt
=
[














Different from a model with complete observation, we assume that we cannot observe
the stock return rate µ nor the driven Brownian motionW directly, and we can only observe
the stock price process {St}t≥0, whose natural filtration is denoted by FS := {FSt }t≥0. We
denote by H := {Ht}t≥0 where Ht = FS,B,Nt = FSt ∨ FBt ∨ FNt , which is the smallest σ-
algebra generated by FSt , FBt and FNt . H collects the information that the insurer actually
has access to. Next, we define our admissible strategy set.
Definition 4.2.1. (Admissible Strategy). A strategy u = {(πt, lt)}t∈[0,T ] is called admissible
if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) u is H-progressively measurable;







We write Π as the set of all admissible strategies.
4.2.3 Objective function
For a controlled surplus process Xu with initial state Xt = x, the objective function is
defined as
Ju(t, x) = E[XuT |Ht]−
γ
2
Var[XuT |Ht], (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R, (4.2.5)
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where γ > 0 is the insurer’s risk aversion.
Note that due to the variance term, Ju(t, x) is time-inconsistent in the sense that it
doesn’t admit the Bellman optimality principle. Following Björk et al. [16], we attach the
problem by viewing it within a game theoretic framework, and look for Nash subgame equi-
librium points. Moreover, since the wealth process (4.2.4) contains unobservable quantities
µ and W , we have a time-inconsistent stochastic control problem with partial information.
Definition 4.2.2. (Equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategies). Consider an admis-




u, t ≤ s ≤ t+ ε,
(π∗s , l
∗(s, z)), t+ ε ≤ s ≤ T,
(4.2.6)





(t, x)− Juε(t, x)
ε
≥ 0,
for any initial state (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R and ε > 0. Then u∗ is called an equilibrium
reinsurance-investment strategy and Ju
∗
(t, x) is the associated equilibrium value function.
4.3 Posterior predictive distribution of µ
Since the stock return rate µ is unobservable, the insurer needs to learn about µ based
on its prior distribution χ and the observable stock price, i.e, the observation filtration FS.
Pham [86] provides a survey of the methods involved in portfolio optimization with partial
information, which covers 3 cases for modelling the unobservable return rate, namely,
Bayesian, linear-Gaussian and finite state Markov chain. Karatzas and Zhao [64] focuses
on Bayesian adaptive portfolio to maximize expected terminal utility. We follow their
methods in the Bayesian framework to derive the dynamic of the posterior estimator:
µ̂t = E[µ|FSt ]. (4.3.1)
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We define
Yt = Wt +
µ− r
σ2
t, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.3.2)
Denote by FY = {FYt }t≥0 the filtration generated by the process Y , and by G = {Gt}t≥0
the auxiliary, enlarged filtration Gµ,Wt = σ(µ,Ws : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) generated by the Brownian
motion W and the random variable µ. Then FYt ⊆ Gt for every t ∈ [0, T ].
The following two lemmas are cited from Karatzas and Zhao [64]( Lemma 2.1 and
Lemma 2.2 on page 634 ).







t}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.3.3)
is a (G,P)-martingale.
We then define a new probability Q equivalent to P on GT as follows,
Q(A) = E[KT · IA], A ∈ GT . (4.3.4)











(1) {Mt}t∈[0,T ] is a (G,Q)-martingale;
(2) {Yt}0∈[0,T ] is a (G,Q) (thus also with respect to FY )-standard Brownian motion and is
independent of the random variable µ under Q;
(3) µ has the same distribution under Q, i.e., we have
P[µ ∈ A] = Q[µ ∈ A] = χ(A), ∀A ∈ B(R).
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By Itô’s lemma, we have




which means the filtration generated by Y coincides with the filtration generated by the
stock price S. In other words, FY = FS. In the following, we will use the above results
to compute the posterior mean µ̂t and reduce the problem with partial observation to one
with complete observation.
µ̂t = E[µ|FSt ]
=























where the third line is due to EQ[MT |FYt ] = EQ[EQ(MT |Gt)|FYt ] = EQ[Mt|FYt ], and
EQ[µMT |FYt ] = EQ[EQ(µMT |Gt)|FYt ] = EQ[µMt|FYt ], since M(·) is a (G,Q) martingale



























































Substitute (4.3.8) and (4.3.9) into (4.3.7), we have the following lemma for the learning of
µ at time t:
Lemma 4.3.3.
µ̂t = r + σ2G(t, Yt), t ∈ (0, T ]. (4.3.10)





(t, y), (t, y) ∈ (0, T ]×R. When t = 0, µ̂0 is just the prior mean
of µ.
Modelling the unobservable expected return rate in a Bayesian framework, Longo and
Mainini [77] investigated the optimal investment problem for a CRRA investor. In a same
modelling and learning framework, Zhang et al. [108] derived the optimal investment and
reinsurance strategy which maximizes the exponential utility, where the reinsurance was
restricted to a proportional one, basic surplus process was approximated as a diffusion
process, and no comparison to the myopic strategy was analyzed.
Lemma 4.3.4. Define





ds = Yt −
∫ t
0
G(s, Ys)ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.3.11)
{Ŵ}t∈[0,T ] is a (FS,P)-standard Brownian motion.
Now we are ready to convert the problem with partial observation into one with com-
plete observation. From
Yt = Wt +
µ− r
σ2





















[(θ − η)z + ηl(t, z)]v(dz)
]
dt










Since the insurer can observe the information set Ht, each quantity in the above dynamics
are observable to the insurer. The original problem now becomes the following time-
inconsistent stochastic control problem with complete observation:
Ju(t, x, y) = E[Xu,t,x,yT ]−
γ
2
Var[Xu,t,x,yT ], (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× R× R, (4.3.14)
where {(Xu,t,x,ys , Y t,ys )}t∈[0,T ] denotes the solution of (4.3.13) starting from (x, y) at time
point t.
4.4 Main results
For ease of notation, denote by C1,2,2([0, T ]×R×R) the space of functions which is first-
order continuously differentiable in t ∈ [0, T ] and second-order continuously differentiable
in x ∈ R and y ∈ R. From (4.3.13), for any φ(t, x, y) ∈ C1,2,2([0, T ] × R × R), the
infinitesimal generator of Xut is given by
Auφ(t, x, y) = φt(t, x, y) +
[
































The following Verification Theorem is similar to Theorem 3.3.1 in Chapter 3, which is
proved in Appendix 3.6, we thus omit the proof here.
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Theorem 4.4.1. (Verification Theorem). Suppose there exist V (t, x, y) and g(t, x, y) ∈
C1,2,2([0, T ]× R× R) satisfying the following conditions:




AuV (t, x, y)− γ
2
Aug2(t, x, y) + γg(t, x, y)Aug(t, x, y)
}
= 0; (4.4.2)
Denote the strategy that attains the supremum by u∗ = (π∗, l∗).
(2) For all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R,
Au∗g(t, x, y) = 0; (4.4.3)
(3) For all (x, y) ∈ R× R,
V (T, x, y) = g(T, x, y) = x. (4.4.4)
Then u∗ is an equilibrium strategy, V (t, x, y) = Ju
∗
(t, x, y) is the corresponding equilibrium
value function, and g(t, x, y) = E[Xu
∗,t,x,y
T ] is the expectation of terminal surplus under the
optimal strategy u∗.































(θ − η)z + ηl∗(t, z)
]
v(dz) = 0,
k(T, y) = 0.
(4.4.6)
58
The equilibrium value function is characterized by
Ju
∗
(t, x, y) = V (t, x, y) = er(T−t)x+K(t, y),


















(l∗)2(t, z)er(T−t) + (θ − η)z + ηl∗(t, z)
]
v(dz) = 0,
K(T, y) = 0.
(4.4.7)
Moreover, the expectation of the terminal surplus is characterized by
g(t, x, y) = er(T−t)x+ k(t, y).
First, the optimal reinsurance strategy l∗ takes an excess-of-loss reinsurance type, with
a time-dependent retention limit
η
γ
e−r(T−t). Therefore, under the time-consistent mean-
variance criterion, an excess-of-loss reinsurance treaty is better than a proportional one.
As reinsurance becomes more expensive, which is measured by η, the insurer will retain
more of the claim risk to himself and purchase less reinsurance. When the insurer becomes
more risk averse, as measured by γ, he or she will undertake less insurance risk and transfer
more to the reinsurer. Also, when the interest rate r increases, it is more costly to borrow
money, and more insurance risk would be retained by the insurer. Moreover, our optimal
reinsurance strategy l∗ is the same with that of Li et al. [68] , since we both assume that
the basic surplus process is completely observable.
Second, the optimal investment strategy π∗ depends on the state variable y through the
learning result µ̂t and function k. Recall that the state process Y represents the dynamic
of the learning result of µ. Therefore, as more stock prices are observed, both the learning
result and the optimal investment strategy will be updated accordingly.
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When uncertainty about the stock return rate is considered, if the insurer first solves
the optimal investment strategy treating the return rate as a known constant, and then








Such an insurer is called myopic, since the dynamic of the learning result of µ is not
incorporated in the decision making process. Having observed Yt = y at time t, the insurer
behaves as if the estimator µ̂t were certain and constant from t onwards. However, by
comparing strategy (4.4.5) and (4.4.9), we can see that the uncertainty about the stock
return rate will actually change the form of the investment strategy, and an additional
hedging term is necessary for optimal purchasing behaviour. The difference between π∗
and π̂ is defined as the hedging demand induced by parameter uncertainty, see Merton
et al. [80]. The term ky in (4.4.5) arises from the incentive of the insurer to hedge against
unfavourable realizations of the unknown parameter µ. Cvitanić et al. [32] showed that the
hedging component induced by learning about the expected return rate can be a substantial
part of the demand, especially for long time horizons.
The direction of the hedging demand may be positive or negative. The following theo-
rem demonstrates the properties of the optimal investment strategies from this perspective.
Theorem 4.4.3.
(1) When µ is a known constant, the optimal strategy π∗ will degenerate to the one with
complete observation, i.e. if µ is a known constant µ, then
π∗(t) = π̂(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.4.10)
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(2) At time T the optimal strategy is equal to the myopic counterpart, i.e.
lim
t→T
π∗(t, y) = π̂(T, y) (4.4.11)




G(t, y) ≤ er(T−t)σ1ρ ∀t ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ R, (4.4.12)
then




G(t, y) ≥ er(T−t)σ1ρ ∀t ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ R, (4.4.13)
then
π∗(t, y) ≤ π̂(t, y) ∀t ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ R.
Function G is defined in equation (4.3.10).
Part (2) of Theorem 4.4.3 says that at the end of the time horizon, the insurer will act
as an myopic investor, since the investment is coming to an end and no further stock prices
would be observed.
To understand part (3) of Theorem 4.4.3, let’s consider the special case when ρ = 0,
i.e., the insurance risk and financial market are independent. When G(t, y) ≥ 0 for all
(t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R, then from equation (4.4.9), π̂t ≥ 0, and a myopic investor will take a
long position. At this time, if the optimal investment strategy π∗ is also positive, then
Theorem 4.4.3 tells us that π∗ will buy less and is more conservative than the myopic
investor. The case when G(t, y) ≤ 0 can be analyzed similarly. However, π∗ and π̂ are
not necessarily of the same sign, it depends on the stock volatility, time horizon and prior
distribution of µ as can be seen from later numerical examples.
The study of the hedging demand for uncertain model parameters can be found in
Brennan [19] and Longo and Mainini [77], where they both look for the optimal portfolio
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maximizing the expected power utility, while the former modelled µ as a random variable
with a Normal priori, and the latter modelled µ as a general integrable random variable.
Different from our result, in the context of maximizing the expected terminal power utility,
the hedging demand depends on the sign of the risk tolerance parameter. Assuming the
market price of risk is constant in sign, when the risk tolerance is positive, the optimal
strategy would be more aggressive, and when the risk tolerance is negative, the associated
optimal strategy would be more conservative. Therefore, the direction of the hedging
demand depends on whether the investor is more or less risk tolerant than a logarithmic
investor in their setting. While for a time-consistent mean-variance insurer, the sign of the
hedging demand is not fixed and depends on other model parameters, even if the market
price of risk is constant in sign.
4.5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we assume that the basic surplus process follows the dynamic
dUt = cdt+ σ1dBt − Vt,
where σ1 = 0.3, {Vt}t∈[0,T ] is a compound Poisson process with jump rate λ = 1 and
severity distribution Γ(α, β), where α = 0.5 and β = 0.7. Note that {Ut}t≥0 is a special





The default values for other parameters are: r = 0.03, σ2 = 0.03, γ = 0.5, T = 5, θ =
0.3, ρ = 0.2, and η = 0.6.
Example 4.5.1. When µ ∼ N(a, b2), for any (t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R, we can get an explicit
expression of G(t, y) as follows,
G(t, y) =




When a = 0.3, b = 1, we can see from figure 4.1 that π∗ doesn’t always lie under π̂ or
above π̂. Actually, function G(t, ·) is a linear function of y for any fixed t, therefore when
condition (4.4.12) or condition (4.4.13) doesn’t hold, part (3) of Theorem (4.4.3) is not
necessarily true.
Figure 4.1: Comparison of π∗ and π̂
In the following, we study the case when µ is discrete random variable with finite




horizon T on the optimal investment strategy π∗. For simplicity, assume from now on that
ρ = 0, i.e. the stock dynamic and the surplus process are independent. Moreover, assume
that µ has 3 possible values µ1, µ2 and µ3 with corresponding probability p1, p2 and p3.




Assume µ1 = 0.04, µ2 = 0.035, µ3 = 0.03, p1 = 0.3, p2 = 0.4, p3 = 0.3. Since r = 0.03,
the market price of risk
µ− r
σ2
≥ 0. Therefore, we have π̂ ≥ 0 and π̂ ≥ π∗. However, π∗ is
not necessarily positive.
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(1) Impact of stock volatility σ2.
From figure 4.2, when σ2 = 0.03 we have π
∗ ≥ 0. When σ2 = 0.005, there exists a
region where π∗ < 0. As shown in figure 4.3, as σ2 decreases, the prior variance of
market price of risk increases, and the minimum value of π∗(t, y) in the simulation
region decreases and extends below zero when σ2 is too small. More specifically, σ2
affects on π∗ through Gy(·, ·), which is the post variance of market price of risk from
equation (4.6.6). Figure 4.4a and figure 4.4b show that π∗ is negative when Gy is too
big. This makes economic sense: when there is too much uncertainty, the optimal
investment strategy may hold a short position even when the market price of risk is
positive.
(a) σ2 = 0.03 (b) σ2 = 0.005
Figure 4.2: Impact of σ2 on π
∗
Figure 4.3: Minimum value of π∗(t, y) w.r.t σ2
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(a) σ2 = 0.03 (b) σ2 = 0.005
Figure 4.4: Effect of σ2 on Gy
(2) Impact of prior distribution of µ.
With σ2 = 0.03 fixed, figure 4.5 compares the optimal investment strategies with dif-
ferent µ1. With µ2, µ3, p1, p2, p3 fixed, increase in µ1 increases the prior variance of µ
from 1.5 ∗ 10−5 to 4.7 ∗ 10−4, thus increasing the post variance Gy, and π∗ changes to
a short position accordingly, as can be seen from figure 4.6a and figure 4.6b.
(a) µ1 = 0.04 (b) µ1 = 0.08
Figure 4.5: Impact of µ1 on π
∗
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(a) µ1 = 0.04 (b) µ1 = 0.08
Figure 4.6: Impact of µ1 on Gy
Example 4.5.3. Impact of T on π∗.
The impact of time horizon T also depends on σ2 and the prior distribution of µ. When
µ1 = 0.04, µ2 = 0.035, µ3 = 0.03 and σ2 = 0.03, figure 4.7 depicts the 3 optimal investment
strategies on the same region when T = 5, T = 15 and T = 25 respectively. It is shown
that in this setting, all the strategies take a long position, and the longer the time horizon,
the smaller amount is invested in stock. In this case, the optimal investment strategy is
more conservative with a longer investment period.
Figure 4.7: Impact of T on π∗ for less uncertain market price of risk
However, when there is more uncertainty with the market price of risk, things will be
more complicated as can be seen in figure 4.8, where either σ2 is decreased or µ is more
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scattered. In both cases, when all 3 strategies are positive, the longer T is, the smaller
amount of money is invested in stock. However, when all 3 strategies are negative, there
is no monotonicity between investment horizon and equilibrium strategy.
(a) σ2 = 0.005 (b) µ1 = 0.08
Figure 4.8: Impact of T on π∗ for more uncertain market price of risk
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proof of Theorem 4.4.2
Proof. We now conjecture that V (t, x, y) and g(t, x, y) are separable in the surplus x and
make the Ansatz{
V (t, x, y) = er(T−t)x+K(t, y), K(T, y) = 0,∀y ∈ R
g(t, x, y) = er(T−t)x+ k(t, y), k(T, y) = 0,∀y ∈ R
(4.6.1)
for some deterministic functions k and K of t and y.
Then for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R, we have
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Vt(t, x, y) = −rer(T−t)x+Kt(t, y), Vx(t, x, y) = er(T−t),
Vy(t, x, y) = Ky(t, y), Vyy(t, x, y) = Kyy(t, y),
Vxx(t, x, y) = Vxy(t, x, y) = 0
V (x− l(t, z), t, y)− V (t, x, y) = −l(t, z)er(T−t).
The same applies to function g if we replace V with g and K with k. Therefore, for
any admissible strategy u = (π, l), we have






























AuV (t, x, y)− γ
2
Aug2(t, x, y) + γg(t, x, y)Aug(t, x, y)
}


























































































attain the last two supremum respectively. Note that the equilibrium strategy doesn’t
depend on function K(·, ·).
By plugging in u∗ = (π∗, l∗) and equation (4.4.3), equation (4.6.1) we have
Au∗g(t, x, y)











(θ − η)z + ηl∗(t, z)
]
v(dz) = 0,
and from equation (4.4.4) we have k(T, y) = 0, ∀y ∈ R.




AuV (t, x, y)− γ
2
Aug2(t, x, y) + γg(t, x, y)Aug(t, x, y)
}
= Kt(t, y) +
1
2














(l∗)2(t, z)er(T−t) + (θ − η)z + ηl∗(t, z)
]
v(dz) = 0,
and K(T, y) = 0,∀y ∈ R.
From Theorem (4.4.1), u∗ = (π∗, l∗) is the equilibrium strategy, and {V (t, x, y) : 0 ≤
t ≤ T} is the associated equilibrium value function.
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4.6.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4.3
Proof. Since
π∗(t, y)− π̂(t, y) = −ky(t, y)
σ2
e−r(T−t) (4.6.2)
We only need to analyze the function ky. Note that function k is the solution of PDE
(4.4.6), from Feynman-Kac formula,



















(G2(s, y + Ys−t)
γ













Here note that Y is a standard Brownian motion under Q.
Therefore we have
ky(t, y) = EQ
[ ∫ T
t




Gy(s, y + Ys−t)ds
]
. (4.6.4)































where D(t, y, ϑ) :=
exp{ϑ− r
σ2













Note that for fixed t and y, D(t, y, ·) can be seen as a probability density function for
random variable X(t, y).




















which completes the proof for part (2).




, Gy(t, y) = 0, µ̂(t) = µ. (4.6.7)
Then ky = 0, and equation (4.4.10) follows.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Allocation of Life Annuity,
Term Life Insurance and
Consumption under General Force of
Mortality
5.1 Introduction
Life annuity and term life insurance are two important types of financial instruments
used by individuals to manage the risks related to their uncertain future lifetimes. In
exchange for an initial lump-sum premium, a life annuity is a financial contract between an
individual and an insurer that pays out a periodic amount as long as the annuitant is alive,
while a term life insurance provides certain death benefit at the individual’s premature
death when in effect. As such, life annuities can be used to hedge longevity risk, namely,
the risk of running out of savings and falling into poverty before dying. On the other
hand, term life insurance can help protect against the loss of family income due to the
breadwinner’s premature death.
This chapter focuses on the optimal life annuity, term life insurance and consumption
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strategies for an individual facing a stochastic time of death, to maximize the expected
CRRA utility from lifetime discounted consumption, bequest motive and terminal wealth
upon survival. A starting point for the modern research on the demand for life insurance
and life annuity, is the seminal paper by Yaari [103] who introduced an optimal consump-
tion problem for an individual with an uncertain time of death within the setup of a
purely deterministic investment environment. Hakansson [52] and Fischer [45] extended
Yaari’s model to a discrete time setup with uncertainty including risky assets. Then in
a continuous-time setup, Richard [89] extended the model from Merton [79] to include
consumption, investment, life insurance rules for an investor with a known distribution of
lifetime, to maximize the expected utility from inter-temporal consumption and bequest
motive. Note that in the aforementioned literature, a single control variable, either the
actuarial note as in Yaari [103] or the premium rate as in Hakansson [52] and Richard [89],
is used to characterize the purchasing decisions for both products.
Along the strand of literature on optimal annuitization when no life insurance is avail-
able, Milevsky and Young [81] incorporates life and pension annuity products into the
portfolio selection literature. In an all or nothing market, where the individual is required
to annuitize all her wealth at retirement, they solve for the optimal age to retire. In an
anything anytime market, where the individual has the flexibility to purchase any amount
of life annuity at any time, they utilize singular control and solve for the optimal annuity
to wealth ratio. Although a general force of mortality is employed, the problem is not
stationary within the infinite time horizon setup. Assuming a constant force of mortality,
Wang and Young [101] and Liang and Young [70] obtained the explicit optimal annuitiza-
tion strategy under power utility and exponential utility, respectively. By incorporating a
non-tradeble labor income risk, Horneff et al. [60] and Chai et al. [25] include both working
life and retirement in their analysis.
Following Richard [89], most studies about life insurance demands simplify the insur-
ance decision by including an instantaneous term life insurance contract in a continuous-
time setting (see Pliska and Ye [87], Huang and Milevsky [61], Bayraktar et al. [11] and
references therein) or a series a renewable one-year term life insurance in a discrete time
setting (see Chen et al. [26]). More realistic lump-sum purchases for life insurance are
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studied in Bayraktar and Young [10] and Hambel et al. [54].
The work of this chapter is different from the existing literature on demand for life an-
nuities and term life insurance on the following points. First, we allow for the simultaneous
holdings of life annuity and term life insurance as state variables. In the existing litera-
ture, decisions of life annuities and term life insurance are typically modelled using a single
control variable, namely, the premium rate, where the controls only depend on the current
wealth. Moreover, when the premium rate is positive, it represents a positive amount of
life insurance, while when the premium rate is negative, it represents a positive amount of
life annuity, where annuitants receive an annuity income when alive and premium is due
at death, under which simultaneous holdings of two products is not possible. However,
the existing amount of life annuity and term life insurance should play an important role
in one’s willingness to purchase more of these products. In practice, a substantial num-
ber of the families that own annuities also have life insurance policies according to Brown
[20]. Second, life annuities and term life insurance can only be bought or surrendered
at realistic lump-sum costs. Formally, we model the insurance decisions as singular and
impulse controls. Such settings are applied for life insurance (see Bayraktar and Young
[10] and Hambel et al. [54]) and life annuities (see Milevsky and Young [81], Wang and
Young [101] and Liang and Young [70]) separately, but not simultaneously. Third, our
model allows for a general force of mortality. Under singular and impulse control setup,
only Milevsky and Young [81] considered a general force of mortality setup to the best of
our knowledge. However, they considered life annuity purchasing without surrender fea-
ture, and didn’t take into account a term life insurance component. Moreover, since they
solved for an infinite-horizon problem, the model is not stationary when mortality beliefs
are time-dependent. Most of the other work in this setting employs a constant force of
mortality, which means the individual’s lifetime follows an exponential distribution.
Mathematically, our problem boils down to solving a variational inequality with gradi-
ent constraints. Assuming the individual has a CRRA preference, we reduce the problem
by one dimension and seek for the numerical solution using penalty methods. In the PDE
theory, penalty approximations have been widely used to show the existence of solution
to variational inequalities, see e.g., Friedman and Spruck [48]. This method has also been
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widely applied in mathematical finance, see Forsyth and Vetzal [47] for pricing American
vanilla options and Dai and Zhong [33] for portfolio selection with proportional transaction
costs, while it’s rarely seen in actuarial content.
We establish some results that are consistent with intuition. Namely, the individual
should allocate more wealth in life annuity if (1) He or she is wealthier or has less existing
life annuity; (2) He or she has a longer expected life time than the pricing group; (3) Less
is taxed on legacy; (4) The pricing rate of life annuity is higher; (5) The wealth process has
a lower return rate; (6) The wealth process is more volatile. The individual is optimal to
allocate more wealth in term life insurance if (1) He or she is wealthier or has less existing
death benefit (2) He or she has a shorter expected lifetime than the pricing group; (3) More
is taxed on legacy; (4) The pricing rate of the term life insurance is higher; (5) The wealth
process has a lower return rate; (6) The wealth process is more volatile; (7) The individual
is more risk averse. For both products, the individual should trade less frequently for a
higher safety loading factor or surrender penalty rate.
We also find some interesting and unforeseen results on the impact of risk attitudes on
one’s willingness to annuitize. We find that the pattern depends on the level of interest
rate. When the interest rate is low, a more risk averse individual should allocate a higher
proportion of wealth in life annuity, a common results also found in other work in the liter-
ature, see Wang and Young [101], Milevsky and Young [81]. But when the interest rate is
relatively high, instead of acting on the size of annuity income, risk attitudes directly affect
the trading frequency as more risk averse individual should trade even more frequently.
This finding is inconsistent with the problem of portfolio selection, and it may root in the
difference between a stock and a life annuity.
An extensive discussion on several widely documented empirical findings in regard to
life annuity and term life insurance is also included along with our numerical examples.
Among others, this include the annuity puzzle and the adverse selection effect in life annuity
markets, the advantageous selection effect in life insurance markets, the insufficient life
insurance among the working-aged, and the excessive life insurance among the elderly,
which will be reviewed in the later sections of this chapter. These empirical findings are
possible in our model under certain parameter settings.
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To have a clear picture of the impact of model parameters and state variables, we first
look into two special cases which are new on their own. In Section 5.3, we study the
demand for life annuity when term life insurance is not available. Compared to this special
case, Milevsky and Young [81] and Liang and Young [70] neglect the surrender feature;
Wang and Young [101] incorporates the surrender feature but assume a constant force of
mortality and all three papers are working under an infinite time horizon. In Section 5.4,
we investigate the case when only term life insurance is available. The closest paper to this
special case utilizing singular control is Bayraktar and Young [10], but their major concern
is optimal life insurance for a household with two wage earners, and a constant force of
mortality is also assumed.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we present the wealth
process for the individual, and introduce the life annuity and term life insurance. In
Section 5.3, we study the optimization problem when only the life annuity is available. In
Section 5.4, we discuss the alternative case when only the term life insurance is available.
In Section 5.5, we consider the general problem when the individual has access to both
products. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Wealth process, life annuity and term life insur-
ance markets
Let (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space, and all the processes in the
following live in this space. Let T > 0 be the fixed time horizon.
Consider an individual with future lifetime described by the random variable τx, where
x is the age of the individual at time 0. Under a consumption policy {ct}t∈[0,T ], the






where µ > 0, σ > 0 and {Bt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion1.




x denote the subjective probability that an individual aged x believes he or











, t > 0.
We have a similar formula for the objective probability of survival, tp
O
x , in terms of the
objective force of mortality function, λOx+t, which can be used to characterize the average
force of mortality of the pricing group. Then we can determine the price for a life annuity
and a term life insurance as follows. The actuarially fair price of a life annuity that pays





The actuarially fair cost of a $1 death benefit, payable at τx if death occurred before T
purchased at age x is Ā1x:T , given by:




In terms of notation, if we use the subjective force of mortality to calculate the survival




, while if we use the objective (pricing) force





the life annuity and term life insurance, we suppose that both premiums are payable when
the contract is issued, thus āx and Ā1x:T are both lump-sum premiums.
The individual wants to maximize the expected utility from a lifetime consumption up
until T , the utility from a bequest motive if a premature death occurred before T , and the
utility from the terminal wealth at T upon survival. Due to the model complexity, we will
in the stock market. Suppose the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with a drift rate of µ′
and volatility σ′: dSt = µ
′Stdt+ σ
′StdBt, then the wealth process with a constant proportion π in stock






dt+σ′πWtdBt. Augmenting the model to include a dynamic
investment component would raise more complexity and could be studied in future research.
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demonstrate our findings in three separate models to have a better grasp of the impact of
different model parameters on the optimal strategies. We separately solve for the optimal
annuitization strategy and the optimal term life insurance strategy in Sections 5.3 and 5.4,
respectively. Note that these two problems are new on their own. For each special case,
compared to literature on optimal annuity (or life insurance) utilizing singular control, we
further allow for surrendering behaviour, assume a general force of mortality, and work
under a finite horizon. In section 5.5 we study the general case when both products are
available in the market.
5.3 Optimal annuity purchasing
In this section, assume that the individual can only consume and buy/surrender life
annuity, without access to term life insurance. Let NBt denote the cumulative amount of
life annuity income purchased on or before time t, and NSt be the cumulative amount of
life annuity income surrendered on or before time t. Then Nt = N
B
t − NSt represents the
cumulative net amount of immediate life annuity income at time t. The wealth and annuity
dynamics of the individual for t < min(τSx , T ) are given bydWt =
[
µWt− − ct− +Nt−
]
dt+ σWt−dBt − (1 + lA)āOx+tdNBt + (1− pA)āOx+tdNSt ,
dNt = dN
B
t − dNSt ,
(5.3.1)
with W0 = w ≥ 0 and N0 = N ≥ 0, where lA ≥ 0 is the safety loading factor of life annuity,
0 ≤ pA ≤ 1 is the surrender penalty rate and āOx+t is defined in (5.2.2). The surrender value
of $1 of annuity income is (1−pA)āOx+t. That is to say, the individual receives (1−pA)āx+t
from the issuer by surrendering $1 of annuity income. A more realistic setup is to allow pA
to change in time, but here we assume the surrender penalty rate is constant for simplicity.
Since we allow the life annuity strategy to jump due to lump-sum purchases, we write the
subscript t− instead of t to denote the values of the corresponding process before any such
jump.
If there is a premature death. i.e., τx < T , the legacy would be left with kWτx , where
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k ∈ [0, 1] measures the after-tax proportion of wealth inherited. If τx > T , the terminal
wealth of the individual at T is WT + āx+TNT , where we include the present fair value
of the remaining life annuity income in the terminal wealth. Note that in Pliska and Ye
[87] such credit was omitted, since their life annuity is of an instantaneous term with the
use of premium rate as the control variable. However, in our setup, it is more appropriate
to include the remaining lifetime income over T , or the incentive to purchase life annuity
cannot be captured sufficiently.
The consumption and life annuity strategies {ct, NBt , NSt }t∈[0,T ] are said to be admissible
if
(i) {ct}t∈[0,T ], {NBt }t∈[0,T ] and {NSt }t∈[0,T ] are adapted to the filtration F.




csds <∞ a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(iv) {NBt }t∈[0,T ] and {NSt }t∈[0,T ] are nondecreasing in t, Wt ≥ 0 and Nt ≥ 0 a.s. for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
5.3.1 Objective function
Fix a time point t, initial statesWt = w,Nt = N , and policy {c,NB,NS} := {cs, NBs , NSs }s∈[t,T ],
the objective function for the individual (who is now aged x+ t) is given by
J (N)(w,N, t; c,NB,NS) := E
[ ∫ τSx ∧T
t
e−r(s−t)u1(cs)ds+ e
−r(τSx −t)u2(kWτSx −)IτSx ≤T
+ e−r(T−t)u3(WT + āx+TNT )IτSx >T
∣∣τSx > t],
for which u1(·), u2(·) and u3(·) are utilities of consumption, bequest motive and terminal
wealth upon survival, respectively. In what follows, we assume that
u1(x) = u2(x) = u3(x) =
xγ
γ
, γ < 1, γ 6= 0, (5.3.2)
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i.e., the individual is assumed to have a constant relative risk aversion of
γ̄ := 1− γ. (5.3.3)
Such utility is common in this line of research, see Milevsky and Young [81] and Pliska and
Ye [87]. Since the Brownian motion {Bt}t∈[0,T ] characterizes the randomness from the fi-
nancial market or more generally, the underlying economy, we can assume it is independent
from the lifetime random variable τSx and then rewrite J
(N) as follows:










































The individual seeks to maximize such expected utility from discounted consump-
tion, bequest motive and terminal wealth upon survival, over all admissible strategies
{c,NB,NS}, and the value function is given by
U (N)(w,N, t) = sup
c,NB ,NS
J (N)(w,N, t; c,NB,NS). (5.3.4)
By standard stochastic control theory (see for instance, Shreve et al. [96] and Fleming and



















(w,N, t) ∈ R+ × R+ × [0, T ),
U (N)(w,N, T ) = u3(w + ā
O











σ2w2Uww + u1(c) + λ
S
x+tu2(kw).
5.3.2 Change of variables
The value function U (N) defined in (5.3.4) is homogeneous of degree γ with respect
to both the wealth w and the annuity N due to the homogeneity property of the CRRA
utility function (see Davis and Norman [38] for a proof). Specifically, for a constant α > 0,
U (N)(αw, αN, t) = αγU (N)(w,N, t). Define y = N
w+N
as the proportion of the current
annuity income in total wealth and V (N)(y, t) := U (N)(1− y, y, t), then
U (N)(w,N, t) = (w +N)γU (N)(1− y, y, t) = (w +N)γV (N)(y, t).
By doing so, the original problem is simplified into a one-dimensional problem. Addition-
ally, it is easy to check that V (N) satisfies
max{V (N)t + max
c̃≥0
Lc̃1V (N), B̃NV (N), S̃NV (N)} = 0, (y, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ),
V (N)(y, T ) =
(1− y + āx+Ty)γ
γ



























Lc̃1V = −(λSx+t + r)V +
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To avoid numerical oscillation due to term γV (N) in the gradient constraints, we further









Lc̃φ(N),BNφ(N),SNφ(N)} = 0, (y, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ),
φ(N)(y, T ) = log(1− y + āx+Ty), y ∈ [0, 1],
(5.3.9)
where
BNφ = 1− (1 + lA)āOx+t +
[
1− y + y(1 + lA)āOx+t
]
φy,
SNφ = (1− pA)āOx+t − 1−
[





















+ µ(1− y)− c̃+ y + σ
2(1− y)2
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BRN = {(y, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ) : BNφ(N) = 0},
SRN = {(y, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ) : SNφ(N) = 0},





whereBRN , SRN andNTRN represent the buy region, surrender region and non-transaction
region of the life annuity, respectively.












= 0, (y, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ),
φ(N)(y, T ) = log(1− y + āx+Ty), y ∈ [0, 1],
(5.3.12)
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where K is a positive constant. (5.3.12) is expected to converge to (5.3.9) as K goes to
infinity. We further impose the following boundary conditions: BNφ(N) = 0 at y = 0, and
SNφ(N) = 0 at y = 1. The boundary conditions imply buying life annuity at y = 0 and
surrendering life annuity at y = 1. We apply finite difference discretization, and upwind
scheme for first order terms especially. Then Newton iteration is applied for nonlinear
terms.
5.3.3 Numerical results
For the numerical study, we consider a Gompertz force of mortality, which is common
in the actuarial literature for annuity pricing. It is written as
λSx+t = ase
bs(x+t) and λOx+t = aoe
bo(x+t).
as bs ao bo age k γ
2.1457 ∗ 10−5 0.09524 2.1457 ∗ 10−5 0.09524 35 1 -1
T r µ σ lA pA
30 0.02 0.06 0.3 0.1 0.3
Table 5.1: Default model parameters
Table 5.1 lists the default parameter values. Mortality parameter values as, bs, ao, bo
are from Milevsky and Young [81], which are fitted to the individual annuity mortality
2000 (basic) table (male) with projection scale G. As demonstrated in Footnote 1, this set
of financial parameters can be interpreted as a constant investment strategy with 50% of
wealth allocated to a stock with a 10% return rate, with the remaining 50% in a bank
account with an interest rate of 2%.
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Figure 5.1: Optimal annuitization strategy under default parameters
Figure 5.1 depicts the optimal annuitization strategy as a function of time and the
existing life annuity ratio under default parameters. The dashed line is the life annuity
buy boundary, below which is the buy region BNR. When the existing life annuity ra-
tio y = N
w+N
lies below the buying boundary, the individual should buy an additional
amount of life annuity ∆N immediately (impulse control) so that the updated life annu-
ity ratio N+∆N
w−(1+lA)āOx+t∆N+N+∆N
moves up to the buy boundary. The solid line is the life
annuity surrender boundary, above which is the surrender region SNR. When the exist-
ing life annuity ratio lies above the surrender boundary, an amount of life annuity ∆N
should be surrendered immediately (impulse control) so that the updated annuity ratio
N−∆N
w+(1−pA)āOx+t∆N+N−∆N
moves down to the surrender boundary. Between the buy boundary
and surrender boundary is the life annuity non-transaction region NTRN . In the interior
of NTRN , the individual shouldn’t purchase or surrender any life annuity and just con-
sume continuously. At the boundary of NTRN , the individual exercises singular control to
buy or surrender life annuity to stay in NTRN . Therefore, all else being equal, the actual
amount of life annuity one should hold increases in wealth and decreases in the existing
amount of life annuity.
Figure 5.2 examines the impact of the subjective force of mortality on the annuitization
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strategy. In both figures, small, medium and large represent scenarios where either one
of the parameter values of the subjective force of mortality is 50% lower, the same and
50% higher (resp.) than the default parameter setting. As expected, the graph shows
that a larger value of as (or bs) leads to a lower buy boundary and surrender boundary.
Namely, the individual will keep a smaller proportion of wealth in life annuity if he or she
believes his or her expected lifetime is smaller than that of the pricing group, and hold
more life annuity if a longer than average lifetime is presumed. This is consistent with the
standard adverse selection observed in annuity market, that is, people with a higher level
of longevity risk purchase more lifetime annuity, see Finkelstein and Poterba [44].
(a) as (b) bs
Figure 5.2: Impact of subjective force of mortality as and bs
Figure 5.3 illustrates the impact of transaction costs, i.e., the loading factor lA and
surrender penalty rate pA. In Figure 5.3a, when the loading factor lA increases, the
buy boundary decreases and the surrender boundary increases, leading to a larger non-
transaction region. Similarly, the non-transaction region expands as the surrender penalty
rate pA increases. Particularly, when pA = 1, we observe that it is never optimal for the
individual to surrender. The intuition is that as transaction costs increase, the individual
tends to decrease the trading frequency to save on the significant transaction costs.
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(a) lA (b) pA
Figure 5.3: Impact of safety loading factor lA and surrender penalty rate pA
In Figure 5.4 we plot the optimal buy and surrender boundaries with varying after-tax
effect k. Larger values of k lead to higher buy and surrender boundaries, which indicates
a higher proportion of wealth in life annuity. With a smaller tax effect, more legacy can
be inherited to cover bequest motive, hence, there is more incentive to invest wealth in life
annuity.
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Figure 5.4: Impact of after-tax proportion k
Figure 5.5 investigates the effect of the interest rate r (used to price annuity) and
the wealth growth rate µ on the annuitization strategy. When r increases, both buy and
surrender boundaries increase and more will be held in life annuity. The reverse effect
holds when µ increases, where the individual is better off enjoying a higher growth rate
in the bank account2. This is consistent with intuition as r and µ measure the growth
rate of the two “investment products”, namely, life annuity and bank account, respectively.
Particularly, when the interest rate r is low, it is optimal for the individual to allocate a
small fraction of wealth to life annuities.
Yaari [103] showed that, in a perfect market setting, expected utility maximizers with
no bequest motive should annuitize their entire wealth. This result was further confirmed
by Davidoff et al. [37] under more general assumptions. Empirical studies find, however,
that only a small portion of private wealth is used to purchase annuities. This discrepancy
between theoretical findings and empirical observations is referred to as the annuity puzzle.
As can be seen in Figure 5.5a, the buy boundary is close to zero when the interest rate is
around 2%, thus the low interest environment might be one possible explanation for the
low annuity demand.
2By bank account we mean the account where wealth grows following the wealth process in (5.2.1).
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(a) r (b) µ
Figure 5.5: Impact of interest rate r and wealth growth rate µ
Figure 5.6: Impact of wealth volatility σ
Figure 5.6 depicts the buy and surrender boundaries for various wealth volatility σ. We
observe that both the buy boundary and surrender boundary increase in σ. As expected,
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this implies that it is optimal to allocate a larger fraction of wealth in annuity when there
is more uncertainty in wealth.
(a) r = 0.01 (b) r = 0.05
Figure 5.7: Impact of risk aversion γ̄ under various interest rates
In Figure 5.7, we study the impact of the risk aversion parameter γ̄ (recall that γ̄ = 1−γ)
on the annuitization behaviour, which is more interesting and less obvious than for the other
parameters. It turns out that the pattern for annuitization behaviour with different risk
attitudes depends on the interest rate r. 3
When the interest rate r is low as in Figure 5.7a, except when close to maturity, we
observe that both the buy boundary and the surrender boundary increase in the risk
aversion parameter γ̄, which implies that it is optimal for a more risk averse individual to
keep a larger fraction of wealth in life annuity. This reflects the life annuity’s feature of
hedging against longevity risk, when the interest rate is relatively low.
3We also run the numerical analysis updating r and µ simultaneously: (1) Assume a stock return rate of
µ′ = 10%, and fix a 50% investment in stock, then the wealth growth rate is µ = 0.5r+ 0.5µ′. (2) Change
r, and µ is determined using a Kelly’s strategy π = µ
′−r
σ . The results for the 3 methods are consistent: If
the individual is more risk averse, he or she should hold more life annuity if r is small, and should trade
more frequently if r is large.
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When the interest rate r is relatively high, the impact of the risk aversion parameter
γ̄ takes a different course. From Figure 5.7b, when the individual is more risk averse
as γ̄ increases, the buy boundary increases while the surrender boundary decreases, in
other words, the non-transaction region for life annuity shrinks. This indicates for high
level of interest rates, rather than working on the magnitude of annuity income, the risk
preference affects the annuity strategy through the trading frequency. A more risk averse
individual should trade more frequently. This phenomenon is inline with intuition in the
sense that a more risk averse individual is more devoted to confining himself or herself to
the specific optimal annuitization strategy and is willing to pay more transaction costs to
achieve this goal. While a less risk averse individual cares less about fixating on the exact
strategy and is fine trading less frequently to adjust the strategy. As a comparison to the
portfolio selection problem, Fellner and Maciejovsky [42] finds that individual risk attitude
is systematically related to market behaviour: the higher the degree of risk aversion, the
lower the observed market activity. This may root in the difference between a stock and a
life annuity.
5.3.4 Summary of findings on demand for life annuity
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing utility from consumption, be-
quest motive and wealth upon survival when only life annuity is available. By numerically
solving the optimal purchasing and surrendering boundaries via penalty methods, we es-
tablish results that are consistent with intuition, as well as find some interesting and
unforeseen results. Namely, all else being equal, the individual should allocate more wealth
to life annuity if
• He or she is wealthier;
• He or she has less existing life annuity;
• He or she has a longer expected lifetime than the pricing group;
• Less will be taxed on legacy;
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• The pricing rate of the life annuity is higher;
• The wealth process has a lower return rate;
• The wealth process is more volatile.
The individual should trade less frequently for more expensive transaction costs (as mea-
sured by the safety loading factor lA or the surrender penalty rate pA).
We also find some interesting and somewhat unexpected results of the impact of risk
attitudes on one’s willingness to annuitize. We find that the pattern depends on the level
of interest rate r. When the interest rate is low, a more risk averse individual should
allocate a higher proportion of wealth in life annuity, a common result also found in some
relevant work in the literature, see Wang and Young [101], Milevsky and Young [81]. But
when the interest rate is relatively high, instead of acting on the size of annuity income,
risk attitudes directly affect the trading frequency, and more risk averse individuals should
trade more frequently.
Moreover, we find that the low interest rate environment could be one possible reason
for the well-known annuity puzzle.
5.4 Optimal term life insurance purchasing
In this section, we consider the problem of optimal term life insurance purchasing and
consumption, when access to life annuity is not available. Let DBt and D
S
t denote the
cumulative amount of term life insurance benefit purchased and surrendered, respectively,
on or before time t. Then Dt = D
B
t − DSt is the net cumulative amount of term life
insurance benefit at time t. When t < min(τSx , T ), the wealth and term life insurance




dt+ σWt−dBt − (1 + lI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O





t − dDSt ,
(5.4.1)
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with W0 = w ≥ 0, D0 = D ≥ 0, where lI ≥ 0 and pI ∈ [0, 1] are the safety loading
factor and surrender penalty rate for the term life insurance, respectively, and the price
function Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
is given in (5.2.3). Remind that the term life insurance is effective until
T . Similarly to the life annuity case, by surrendering $1 of death benefit, the individual
receives (1 − pI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
from the term life insurance issuer. The dynamics contain
jumps due to lump-sum purchases of term life insurance, and t− denotes the values of the
associated process right before any such jump.
If death occurred before T , the term life insurance would be in effect and the legacy
would be kWτSx − + DτSx −, where k is still the after-tax proportion on legacy. Note that
most life insurance death benefit are not counted as taxable income.
The consumption and term life insurance strategies {ct, DBt , DSt }t∈[0,T ] are said to be
admissible if
(i) {ct}t∈[0,T ], {DBt }t∈[0,T ] and {DSt }t∈[0,T ] are adapted to the filtration F.




csds <∞ a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(iv) {DBt }t∈[0,T ] and {DSt }t∈[0,T ] are nondecreasing in t, Wt ≥ 0 and Dt ≥ 0 a.s. for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
5.4.1 Objective function
Fix a time point t (t < T ), given initial wealth Wt = w, initial death benefit Dt = D
and policy {c,DB,DS} := {cs, DBs , DSs }s∈[t,T ), the objective function for the individual
(aged x+ t now) is given by
J (D)(w,D, t; c,DB,DS)
:= E
[ ∫ τSx ∧T
t
e−r(s−t)u1(cs)ds+ e

























with the same utility functions defined in (5.3.2), and τSx is also assumed to be independent
from the Brownian motion {Bt}t≥0. The value function for this individual is defined for
(w,D, t) ∈ R+ × R+ × [0, T ) by
U (D)(w,D, t) = sup
c,DB ,DS
J (D)(w,D, t; c,DB,DS). (5.4.2)










D − (1 + lI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
U (D)w , (1− pI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O





(w,D, t) ∈ R+ × R+ × [0, T ),
U (D)(w,D, T ) = u3(w), (w,D) ∈ R+ × R+,
(5.4.3)
in which







σ2w2Uww + u1(c) + λ
S
x+tu2(kw +D).
We define z = D
w+D
as the proportion of death benefit in total wealth and V (D)(z, t) =










Lc̃φ(D),BDφ(D),SDφ(D)} = 0, (z, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ),

















SDφ = (1− pI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O − 1−
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The buy region, surrender region and non-transaction region for the term life insurance
are defined as
BRD = {(z, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ) : BDφ(D) = 0},
SRD = {(z, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, T ) : SDφ(D) = 0},






We still apply Gompertz force of mortality as in Section 5.3 and Table 5.2 lists the
default parameter values. Note that some of the parameter values in Table 5.2 are adjusted
to be different from the ones in Table 5.1, to gain a clearer view of the sensitivity analysis.
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as bs ao bo age k γ
2.1457 ∗ 10−5 0.09524 2.1457 ∗ 10−5 0.09524 35 1 -2
T r µ σ lI pI
30 0.02 0.06 0.2 0.05 0.5
Table 5.2: Default model parameters
Figure 5.8: Optimal term life insurance strategy under default parameters
Figure 5.8 depicts the optimal term life insurance strategy under default parameters.
Similar to Section 5.3, the dashed line and solid line are term life insurance buy boundary
and surrender boundary, respectively. When the existing death benefit lies below the
buy boundary (above the surrender boundary), a finite amount of death benefit will be
purchased (surrendered) immediately to move up (down) to the buy (surrender boundary).
Within the non-transaction region NTRD, the individual should stay with what he or she
has and only consume. Similar as before, the amount of term life insurance one should
hold increases in wealth and decreases in the existing amount of death benefit.
In terms of the evolution of demand in time: we observe that one should allocate a
positive fraction of wealth in term life insurance at the beginning of the time period, since
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we start with an individual with no insurance at time 0 and it’s natural for the individual
to likely purchase some coverage early on. Then it is followed by a large non-transaction
region for a certain length of time, where one should stay with what he or she has and
stop from purchasing or surrendering any term life insurance. After that, it is followed by
a period where surrender activity picks up, and the surrender amount mainly depends on
the mortality risk, risk preference, after-tax effect, wealth growth rate and wealth volatility
(will be discussed later on). When close to maturity, the wealth composition stay fixed
and one should refrain from trading any more.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the impact of the individual’s subjective force of mortality on his
willingness to purchase term life insurance. In these figures, small, medium and larger
represent scenarios where either one of the parameter values of the subjective force of
mortality is 50% lower, the same and 50% higher (resp.) than the default parameter setting,
unless otherwise specified in the figure captions. From Figure 5.9a, both boundaries are
mostly insensitive to as, except when close to maturity, where it is optimal for people with
higher mortality risk (large as) to surrender less and hold more term life insurance. bs
has a more obvious effect on the boundaries. In Figures 5.9b and 5.9c, we observe that,
over most of the time horizons, a larger value of bs leads to higher buy and surrender
boundaries, namely, the individual should hold more term life insurance with the increase
in the subjective mortality risk. However, note that there are time intervals over which such
relation no longer holds. For example, when the subjective mortality risk is significantly
higher than the objective one (as in Figure 5.9c), people with higher mortality risk purchase
less when young, and the shape of the buy and surrender region are remarkably different.
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(a) as (b) bs = large is 50% higher
(c) bs = large is 100% higher
Figure 5.9: Impact of subjective force of mortality as and bs
In Figure 5.10 we analyze the impact of the individual’s risk aversion parameter γ̄
(recall that γ̄ = 1− γ). When the individual is more risk averse as γ̄ increases, both buy
and surrender boundaries increase. This implies that, all else being equal, more risk averse
people should hold more term life insurance. Also note that such trend does not depend
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on the level of interest rate r, which is different from the annuitization behaviour4.
(a) r = 0.02 (b) r = 0.05
Figure 5.10: Impact of risk preference γ̄ under various interest rates
After studying the impact of the subjective force of mortality and risk preference, we
want to discuss a phenomenon, commonly known as advantageous selection-where lower
risk individuals (i.e., individuals with lower mortality risks) have more insurance, see Caw-
ley and Philipson [24] for life insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry [43] for long-term care
insurance and Cutler et al. [31] for a comprehensive review. In Figure 5.9c, we have seen
people with lower mortality risk purchase more term life insurance when young, even for a
fixed level a risk aversion. Next, in Figure 5.11, we compare the buy and surrender bound-
aries for two individuals. The red lines correspond to an individual with higher mortality
risk (higher values of as and bs than their counterparts for the objective mortality) and
lower risk aversion (larger γ), and the blue lines correspond to another individual with
lower mortality risk (smaller values of as and bs than their counterparts for the objective
4As in the numerical analysis for optimal annuitization, we also test the effect of γ̄ incorporating an
investment strategy: either with a constant proportion strategy or a Kelly’s strategy, see Footnote 5.3.3
for details. It turns out that more risk averse individuals should keep more term life insurance for both
small and large interest rate r.
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mortality) and higher risk aversion (or smaller γ). Over the first 20 years (i.e., from time 0
to time 20 in Figure 5.11), the individual with lower mortality risk and higher risk aversion
allocates more wealth in term life insurance than the one with higher mortality risk and
lower risk aversion. As studied in Cutler et al. [31], in life insurance market, heterogeneous
risk aversion can help explain why people with lower mortality rates have more insurance.
From their empirical study, individuals who don’t engage in what are commonly thought
of as risky behaviours or who take measures to reduce risk are systematically more likely
to hold life insurance products, but these same individuals tend to have lower expected
claims, leading the lower risk to have more coverage. Using our model, the phenomenon
of advantageous selection for life insurance can be realized. It also provides support to the
explanations in Cutler et al. [31] pertaining to the life-cycle optimal control.
Figure 5.11: Illustration of advantageous selection
Next, Figure 5.12 depicts the impact of transaction costs, including the loading factor lI
and the surrender penalty rate pI . From Figure 5.12a, the surrender boundary is minimally
impacted by the change in lI , while the buy boundary decreases in lI , which means less
term life insurance should be purchased when the safety loading increases. Equivalently,
the non-transaction region expands as lI increases. The same is true for the surrender
penalty rate pI as can be seen from Figure 5.12b. Worthy of mention is the case when
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pI = 1 where it is never optimal to surrender. Therefore, the safety loading and surrender
penalty rate act on the non-transaction region, and people should trade less frequently
when transaction costs increase.
(a) lI (b) pI
Figure 5.12: Impact of safety loading factor lI and surrender penalty rate pI
Figure 5.13 examines the effect of the after-tax rate k. When less legacy is taxed (i.e., as
k increases), both the buy boundary and the surrender boundary decrease. Hence, all else
being equal, it is optimal for the individual to allocate less wealth in term life insurance,
because more legacy can be inherited and the bequest motive is better managed. Note
that when the tax rate is extremely high on legacy, e.g. when k = 0, the individual will
allocate a positive fraction of wealth in term life insurance over the entire time period.
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Figure 5.13: Impact of after-tax proportion k
Figure 5.14a depicts the impact of the interest (pricing) rate r. Both the buy boundary
and the surrender boundary increase in r. That is to say, the individual should keep a
larger fraction of wealth in term life insurance for a higher r. The intuition is that for the
same amount of death benefit, the premium is lower with a higher value of r.
Figure 5.14b illustrates how the wealth accumulation rate µ affects the term life in-
surance buy/surrender behaviour. We observe that both the buy boundary and surrender
boundary decrease in µ, which leads to a smaller fraction of wealth in term life insurance.
Note that wealth can be inherited as a legacy to hedge the risk of a premature death. As µ
increases, the accumulation of wealth is preferred over the alternative of investing in term
life insurance.
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(a) r (b) µ
Figure 5.14: Impact of interest rate r and stock return rate µ
Figure 5.15 shows the impact of the wealth volatility σ. When the wealth is more
volatile (i.e., as σ increases), both the buy boundary and the surrender boundary increase,
and consequently, it is optimal for the individual to keep more wealth in term life insurance.
Note that the two boundaries are more sensitive to changes in σ (in comparison to changes
in the interest rate r and the wealth growth rate µ).
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Figure 5.15: Impact of wealth volatility σ
At this moment, we want to discuss two empirical puzzles observed in life insurance
market. One is insufficient life insurance among the working-aged, see Bernheim et al.
[14, 13]. This observation is possible for most of our scenarios, since the buy boundary
easily stays at zero after an initial short time period in most of our figures. Especially,
expensive safety loading and surrender penalty rate (Figure 5.12), low level of interest
rate and high wealth growth rate (Figure 5.14) can push the buy boundary to be zero
over the entire time horizon. The other empirical observation is excessive life insurance
among the elderly, see Brown [20] and Cutler and Zeckhauser [30]. From our result, high
level of subjective force of mortality (Figure 5.9c) and high tax rate (Figure 5.13) can both
trigger a positive buy boundary in late time periods. Hurd and McGarry [62] finds that the
subjective force of mortality increases in age due to unanticipated change in health and with
the death of a parent. As such, higher than average subjective force of mortality might
help explain the excessive holdings of life insurance among the elderly. Although these
empirical observations are from life insurance market and we study term life insurance,
we argue that life insurance can be approximated by term life insurance when T is long
enough.
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5.4.3 Summary of findings on demand for term life insurance
In this section, we study the problem of maximizing utility from consumption, bequest
motive and terminal wealth upon survival when only term life insurance is available. By
applying a penalty method to the free boundary problem, we obtain a numerical solution to
the optimal buy and surrender region, and an analysis of the corresponding results allows
us to reach the following conclusions: All else being equal, it is optimal for an individual
to allocate more wealth in term life insurance if
• He or she is wealthier;
• He or she has less existing death benefit;
• He or she has a shorter expected lifetime compared to the objective pricing group;
• More is taxed on legacy;
• The pricing rate of the term life insurance is higher;
• The wealth process has a lower return rate;
• The wealth process is more volatile;
• The individual is more risk averse.
An individual should trade less frequently when the transaction costs are more expensive
(higher lI or pI).
Moreover, some empirical findings in life insurance market including advantageous selec-
tion, insufficient life insurance among the working-aged and excessive life insurance among
the elderly, can be realized and partially explained using our model.
5.5 General case
In this section, we consider the general case when both life annuity and term life






t are defined as in the previous
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two sections. The controlled wealth process Wt, after considering consumption, and the
purchase and surrender of life annuity and term life insurance, follows the dynamic
dWt =
[
µWt− − ct− +Nt−
]
dt+ σWt−dBt − (1 + lI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
dDBt − (1 + lA)āOx+tdNBt
+ (1− pI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
dDSt + (1− pA)āOx+tdNSt , t < min(τSx , T ),
dDt = dD
B
t − dDSt ,
dNt = dN
B
t − dNSt ,
(5.5.1)
with W0 = w ≥ 0, D0 = D ≥ 0 and N0 = N ≥ 0.
For a death time τSx ≤ T , the total legacy is DτSx − + kWτSx −, where k is the after-tax
proportion. If τSx > T , the term life insurance expires and the terminal wealth of the
individual at T is WT + āx+TNT . Admissible strategies are defined similarly as in Sections
5.3 and 5.4.
5.5.1 Objective function
At each time point t ∈ [0, T ), with initial wealth, life annuity and term life benefit to
be w, N and D, respectively, the individual seeks to maximize the expected utility of the
discounted lifetime consumption up to T , the bequest motive for a premature death, and




[ ∫ τSx ∧T
t
e−r(s−t)u1(cs)ds+ e
−r(τSx −t)u2(DτSx + kWτSx )IτSx ≤T















































where u1(·), u2(·) and u3(·) are defined in (5.3.2). Still, we assume that τSx and the Brownian
motion {Bt}t≥0 are independent.
The value function U , defined by
U(w,N,D, t) = sup
c,NB ,NS ,DB ,DS
J(w,N,D, t; c,NB,NS,DB,DS), (5.5.3)





Lc0U,UD − (1 + lI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
Uw, UN − (1 + lA)āOx+tUw,
(1− pI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O
Uw − UD, (1− pA)āOx+tUw − UN
}
= 0, (w,N,D, t) ∈ R3+ × [0, T ),
U(w,D,N, T ) = u3(w + ā
O
x+TN), (w,N,D) ∈ R3+,
(5.5.4)
where







σ2w2Uww + u1(c) + λ
S
x+tu2(D + kw).
Due to the homogeneity property of the CRRA utility function, i.e., U(αw, αN, αD, t) =
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, V (y, z, t) = U(1− y − z, y, z, t).
Then
U(w,N,D, t) = (w +N +D)γV (y, z, t),
and the problem is simplified to the quantity V which has one fewer state variable (than
U). With new variables y and z, define
φ(y, z, t) =
log(γV (y, z, t))
γ
,
then the function φ satisfiesmax{φt + maxc̃≥0 L
c̃φ,BDφ,BNφ,SDφ,SNφ} = 0,
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O
z)φz + ((1 + lI)Ā 1x+t:T−t
O − 1)yφy,
BNφ = 1− (1 + lA)āOx+t + ((1 + lA)āOx+t − 1)zφz + (1− y + (1 + lA)āOx+ty)φy,
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Buy, surrender and non-transaction regions for life annuity and term life insurance are
defined similarly as before, except that now the space is two-dimensional in terms of the
state variables y and z. Below is a hypothetical example of a time snapshot for each region.
Figure 5.16: A hypothetical example of regions
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5.5.2 Numerical results
As for the previous two sections, we consider a Gompertz mortality law and Table 5.3
lists the default parameter values.
as bs ao bo age k γ pI
2.1457 ∗ 10−5 0.09524 2.1457 ∗ 10−5 0.09524 35 1 -2 0.3
T r µ σ lA lI pA
30 0.02 0.06 0.3 0.05 0.05 0.3
Table 5.3: Default parameter values
(a) t = 0 (b) t = 15
(c) t = 21
Figure 5.17: Time snapshots of life annuity and term life insurance region
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In Figure 5.17, we plot the non-transaction region, i.e., NTRN ∩NRRD in Figure 5.16.
As can be seen, both the optimal buy (blue dashed line) and surrender (blue solid line)
boundaries for life annuities are function of the death benefit ratio. Similarly, the optimal
buy (red dashed line) and surrender (red solid line) boundaries for term life insurance are
also function of the annuity ratio. We observe that no term life insurance is purchased.
Actually, we find that there is no noticeable difference for term life insurance when we
change the values of the after-tax proportion k, and the individual only purchases term
life insurance when it is close to maturity. We also observe that the term life insurance
surrender boundary is high for low values of life annuity ratio. As for the life annuity, we
see that it is optimal to allocate a positive fraction of wealth in life annuity. The intuition
behind this result is that the income from the life annuity position immediately increases
the size of wealth which will be inherited as a result of a death prior to time T . As in the
previous sections, the non-transaction region expands as time approaches the maturity.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, by modelling the life annuity decision and term life insurance decision
using singular and impulse control separately, we consider the problem of maximizing the
expected utility from discounted lifetime consumption, bequest motive and terminal wealth
upon survival. Applying a penalty method, we solve for the optimal buy and surrender
boundaries for both products. The main takeaways are as follows:
1. All else being equal, the individual should allocate more wealth in life annuity if
• He or she is wealthier;
• He or she has less existing life annuity;
• He or she has a longer expected lifetime than the pricing group;
• Less is taxed on legacy;
• The pricing rate for life annuities is higher;
• The wealth process has a lower return rate;
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• The wealth process is more volatile.
2. All else being equal, the individual is optimal to allocate more wealth in term life
insurance if
• He or she is wealthier;
• He or she has less existing death benefit;
• He or she has a shorter expected lifetime than the pricing group;
• More is taxed on legacy;
• The pricing rate for term life insurance is higher;
• The wealth process has a lower return rate;
• The wealth process is more volatile;
• The individual is more risk averse.
3. For both products, the individual should trade less frequently for a higher safety
loading factor or surrender penalty rate.
4. The individual may not allocate more wealth in life annuity if he or she is more risk
averse. This depends on the level of interest rate.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future works
The main contribution of this thesis is that it has employed models more in line with
reality, in regard to both the underlying dynamics and control variables, to the study of
stochastic control problems of interest in insurance contexts.
More specifically, in Chapter 3, instead of adopting the commonly used spectrally
negative Lévy process (SNLP), the underlying basic surplus process for the insurer is
allowed to have contagious features, which allows for contagion due to endogenous (self-
exciting) and exogenous (externally-exciting) factors. We generalized the result within
the SNLP framework that an excess-of-loss reinsurance treaty is optimal under the time-
consistent mean-variance criterion, and demonstrated new findings that contagion risk
does play an important role in the reinsurance strategy through the tail heaviness of the
claim size distribution. In Chapter 4, we recognized the partial information of the stock
return rate, and explicitly analyzed the hedging demand due to such partial information
with Bayesian learning under time-consistent mean-variance criterion. In Chapter 5, in
addition to the current wealth, which is the sole state variable in most of the existing
literature, we further took into account existing life annuity and term life insurance as
state variables. Moreover, life annuity and term life insurance can only be purchased
or surrendered at realistic lump-sum costs. Under a general force of mortality, optimal
non-transaction regions have been solved numerically.
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This work can be further extended in the following possible directions:
First, in Chapter 3, for tractability, both the insurance and reinsurance premium rates
are assumed to be time-dependent and stochastic, which may not be allowed by reinsurance
contract or regulations in practice. One way to address this issue is by using a constant
rate under the expectation principle, where one associated issue is to demonstrate the
existence of an analytical solution. On the other hand, the optimal reinsurance strategy
does not depend on parameters of the externally-exciting effect, namely, it does not act
on catastrophic events. One possible reason is the assumption of stochastic premium rate
which fully hedges the catastrophic risk as pointed out in Chapter 3, but other utility
preferences are also worthy of investigation.
Second, the work in Chapter 5 can be further extended in the following possible direc-
tions: (1) Incorporate labor income in the wealth process : Since a major function of term
life insurance is to protect against the loss of the breadwinner’s income in case of a prema-
ture death, incorporating labor income is more reasonable. Actually, as demonstrated in
Richard [89] and Pliska and Ye [87], the demand for life insurance is directly affected by
one’s human capital, which is the discounted value of future income. One difficulty arising
from the labor income is that the value function is no longer homogeneous in the state
variables, and numerical solution with three spatial states are generally challenging. (2)
Allow for investment in risky assets : Chen et al. [26] showed that individuals should make
asset allocation decisions and life insurance decisions jointly.
The third direction is on framing the problem in an equilibrium setting. This thesis
only focuses on one party’s interest when studying the optimal problem, while “ an agree-
ment which is quite attractive to one party may not be acceptable to its counterparty”,
as demonstrated by Borch in 1960s. In an equilibrium setting, premiums are not taken
as given, but rather set based on interactions between sellers and buyers. Especially, the
empirical findings from life annuity and insurance market are the result of multiple partic-
ipants’ interaction, including individuals and insurance companies. After understanding
individual’s behaviour when prices are given, it will definitely be worth studying whether
a market equilibrium exists and if so how to find it.
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